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المراجع	IOR/R/15/1/584
العنوان	"ملف (D 55 61/14 VIII) العلاقات بين نجد والعراق"
التاريخ/ التواريخ	٢٢ ديسمبر ١٩٢٨-٢٩ أبريل ١٩٢٩ (ميلادي)
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المؤسسة المالكة	المكتبة البريطانية: أوراق خاصة وسجلات من مكتب الهند
حق النشر	<u>الملكية العامة</u>

حول هذا السجل

يتكون المجلد من رسائل وبرقيات وتقارير تتعلق بشؤون وعلاقات الانتداب البريطاني في العراق مع مملكة نجد. وتدور أغلب المراسلات بين ليو أميري وزير الدولة لشؤون المستعمرات، أوستن تشمبرلين وزير الخارجية (كلاهما في لندن)، هنري دوبس المندوب السامي في العراق (وجيلبرت كلايتون القائم بأعمال المندوب السامي في العراق فيما بعد)، ليونيل هاوورث المقيم السياسي في بوشهر، سيريل باريت الوكيل السياسي في البحرين، جيمس مور الوكيل السياسي في الكويت، ابن سعود ملك الحجاز ونجد وملحقاتهما، جون جلوب المفتش الإداري في العراق، جيرالد دي جوري مسؤول الخدمة الخاصة في الكويت، الوكالة البريطانية في جدة، والحكومة في الهند.

يتناول المجلد فترة الاضطرابات بعد ثورة الإخوان، بما في ذلك عدد الغارات على الكويت ومعركة سبيلا التي كان لها أثر فعال في إنهاء الأزمة. ومن الموضوعات التي يتناولها المجلد:

- إغارة الإخوان على الكويت؛


- هجوم على سيارة بطريق الكويت - البصرة قُتل على إثره المبعوث الأمريكي هنري بيلكيرت؛
 - معلومات استخباراتية حول التحركات والأنشطة القبلية، خاصة المتعلقة بقبائل الإخوان مثل مطير والعجمان وعُتيبة، والتهديد بغارات عبر الحدود وتنفيذها، جُمع كل ذلك من تقارير كتبها جون جلوب والملازم طيار هاوز (مسؤول الخدمة الخاصة بالكويت)، وكذلك الشائعات والتقارير المحلية؛
 - قضايا تتعلق بالدفاع عن الكويت؛
 - فشل جيلبرت كلايتون وابن سعود في التوصل لاتفاق حول شرعية "مواقع الشرطة" التي بصحراء العراق؛
 - أفكار ودوافع وقدرات ابن سعود؛
 - لقاء ثان بين ابن سعود وقادة الإخوان في الرياض في محاولات لحل الأزمة؛
 - فكرة حصار موانئ الأحساء لإجبار القبائل النجدية على الخضوع والاستسلام؛
 - معركة سبيلا وتداعياتها.
- كما توجد موضوعات أخرى تشمل:
- سجن نحيطر بن جريد من قبيلة الظفير في حائل؛
 - ضرورة إنشاء قنوات اتصال مع ابن سعود (على سبيل المثال عن طريق بوشهر أو جدة).
- يوجد داخل المجلد رسم تخطيطي مبدئي وملاحظات شاملة كتبها هارولد ديكسون حول الهجرات الموسمية للقبائل الرعوية في الفرات الأدنى.
- يوجد في نهاية المجلد (الأوراق ٣٧٨-٣٨٢) ملاحظات مكتوبة.





"ملف (D 55 61/14 VIII) العلاقات بين نجد والعراق" [أمامي] (٧٨٢/١)





































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
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
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
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ج.ع.







2. Our regret is very great, as this reply from the British Government not only destroys all our hopes for a settlement of the matter, but is an arrow directed towards our confidence in the conversations we had with the British representative at Uqair and has affected our confidence in all the covenants and engagements we have concluded, and shall conclude, with Britain. This result made the worst impression in the whole of Nejd.

3. We have gathered the people of Nejd and presented to them, from all aspects, the result of the situation arrived at, but the explanation increased their insistence that they were right and their determination to resist the injustice to their country.

4. The only plea put forward by the British Government on their own behalf and on behalf of Iraq with regard to our objection to the building on the borders of the frontiers is that our request for the prohibition of building restricts the principle of the liberty of the right of every Government to take administrative measures within its territory. The British Government will realise, as they acknowledged in their letter, that such right was limited by written agreements.

5. The lands against the building on which we protested do not belong to Iraq but are the property of Nejd and the tribes of Nejd formerly and latterly. It was the Amirs of Nejd who governed those deserts, as all who know Iraq and Nejd from the earliest times until to-day bear witness.

6. We maintained our right to those lands at the time of the meeting of Uqair and insisted on this because they belong to us, our people and our subjects, and we refused the Treaty of Mohammerah for this reason. But the British representative insisted most strongly and compelled us to yield them to Iraq, and we were obliged to accept so that the dispute might not be the cause of the outbreak of war between us and the British Government.


7. The British representative offered us, as a price for that concession, a promise that no fortification or stronghold menacing to Nejd or its people would be built in the lands taken from us. This is in the statement which includes the borders of the frontiers and does not limit them by mile or metre. The verbal declarations of the British representative convinced us that Britain would preserve that. Unfortunately, we have had no result from those declarations.

8. The British Government will thus see that our object and claim in these lands at that time was for the following reasons:—

- (a.) To conserve the right of Nejd to its territories as they formerly were and as they have continued from the earliest time.
- (b.) That these territories are dwelling places for the people of Nejd and pasture lands for them.
- (c.) That these places are the door of Nejd, and Nejd can only be assured of her independence and life if these territories are under her constraint and suzerainty, as she was unable in former times to protect herself in her country except when the deserts of those regions were under her constraint and suzerainty.

The claim of Nejd for those territories was the claim of one to preserve his life and soul. When we were thus compelled at Uqair, we asked for the preservation of the rights of our subjects and for the preservation of the rights of Nejd and her independence and an assurance to preclude what might be taken at some hour as a base for aggression against her. When we were granted our request in this respect, the great calamity in abandoning that part of the territories which is, in fact, the true castle of defence to Nejd was slightly lessened.

9. In addition to the above, Sir Gilbert Clayton enquired of us the reason of our insistence on our principle set out in the third clause of the Protocol of Uqair. We answered him that what we saw of the Iraq Government and their movements did not reassure us about the future but increased our fears, for we see her aggression against us daily increasing. Our lands were taken at Uqair, and yesterday our agreement was broken in the erection of buildings which she called guard posts and, to reassure us, affirmed that they are only police stations. But she did not wait for eve till morn before changing those guard posts into strong fortifications containing all the requirements of military citadels and fortresses. She is able every day to invent a reason and make stations in lands which are without doubt Nejd, to expose Nejd to all sorts of harm, such as the aeroplanes and cars drawn from those stations which unjustifiably penetrated our territories even in the days of the negotiations. There are the interferences of Iraq officials with our subjects which continue until



to-day, against which we have protested and to which the newspaper "Al Iraq," published in Bagdad on the 19th Tashrin Awal, 1347, referred. We are therefore not secure from Iraq.

10. If there were no third clause of the Protocol of Uqair between Nejd and Iraq, Nejd would see in those buildings a menace to her existence and independence built with evil intention against her, and she cannot be reassured about her life while they exist. She protests against their erection and opposes it. In doing so she sees herself defending her right and her life threatened some day by sudden danger.

11. We therefore beg the British Government for the preservation of the interests of right, justice and equity to reconsider their decision in this matter and look considerably on what we have mentioned in this letter in order to preserve tranquillity and calm in a country where it is not at all to the interest of the British Government to see incalculable bloodshed.

12. When we concluded the Protocol of Uqair it never entered our mind that there would be any room for explanation or interpretation, and that what was given us as compensation for the loss of our territories would be taken from us through interpretation. We had no doubt or suspicion as to the correctness of our arguments and proofs, and we had no idea that we should be invited to go to an arbitrator for judgment in a thing which is as clear as daylight. We believe that the foregoing explanation will convince the British Government to reconsider their decision. If, however, all that has already been mentioned does not result in explaining the truth and matters have reached such an extreme of confusion that the British Government will not be satisfied to execute the third clause of the Protocol of Uqair as it stands unless it is referred to arbitration, we, in spite of the interior difficulties which we face in the present situation, will accede to the request of the British Government and accept arbitration if the British Government will take into consideration the state and position of the Nejd people on the frontiers in this matter and will observe the following points with regard to the arbitration:—


- (1.) The arbitrators shall be constituted of two parties, of which we shall choose part and the Iraq Government the other part.
- (2.) The British Government will be neutral in this arbitration.
- (3.) The arbitrators shall be people familiar with the conditions of the Arabs, zealous in the interests of the Arab question, solicitous of the preservation of the independence of Nejd and of Iraq now and in the future.
- (4.) That the subject of discussion by the arbitrators should be to study the position from its origin and to return to the examination of the frontiers between Iraq and Nejd. To learn what formerly went on and the occurrence of incidents in the past for which there is no lawful justification.
- (5.) The British Government will be responsible for the execution in Iraq of the decision, whether to Iraq or to Nejd, that the arbitrators will make.
- (6.) After the decision of the arbitrators it is necessary that consideration should be given to avoid harm falling on any party in the execution of the arbitration.
- (7.) The question of the arbitration should be decided and settled as soon as possible, because the position is critical and delicate and brooks no delay.

13. If the above-mentioned basis is considered, we await the views of the British Government in this respect.

14. We have taken note of what is mentioned in the sixth paragraph of the letter of the British Government regarding the inclusion of British forces within the scope of the article 6 of the Treaty of Bahra and article 10 of the Treaty of Hadda, but the condition mentioned in that paragraph is contradictory to the article itself, for the text of article 6 of the Treaty of Bahra is as follows:—

"The forces of Iraq and Nejd may not cross the common frontier in the pursuit of offenders except with the consent of both Governments."

This text contains no condition or stipulation. Do the British Government wish to make here room for disagreement so as to justify the action of the aviators who crossed our territories and then desire to refer the interpretation to a committee of arbitration too? This condition is new to the discussion. So we beg the British Government to reconsider this view in correcting it and to leave the article in its reality, because the door of interpretation will leave no value in the treaties.



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
15. We received with regard the assurances of the British and Iraq Governments officially when Sir Gilbert Clayton declared to us that nothing would be done on their part to oppose the rights which the Nejd tribes enjoyed, either in roaming, grazing or taking water from the wells and the waters situated within the Iraq frontiers in accordance with the old accepted customs.

16. In any case, we thank the British Government for the desire they have expressed to arrive at a solution to remove the standing dispute, and we hope to receive their early reply to our letter as the position is still critical and requires most speedy settlement.

This is what we beg to be conveyed to the British Government.

Respects,
(Sealed) IBN SAUD.

December 10, 1928.



[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government.]

EASTERN (ARABIA).

January 22, 1929.

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 1.

[E 387/3/91]

No. 1.

Mr. Jakins to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received January 22, 1929)

(No. 231.)
Sir,

Jeddah, December 31, 1928.

IN continuation of my despatch No. 214 of the 20th December I have the honour to transmit herewith a further translation of the report* of the meeting of Ibn Saud with the Nejd tribes at Riyadh. This extract comprises the complaints of the tribal spokesmen and the replies of the ulema and of the King.

2. The tribes are reported as acknowledging that their enlightenment came from Ibn Saud and from God. They begged His Majesty that he would ensure that all his subjects received the spiritual guidance he had provided for themselves. They asked whether the telegraph was not witchcraft and then, closely following a familiar argument, questioned the wisdom of allowing the frontier to be fixed in their country. Finally, with an apt reference to the Uqair Protocol, they said that they would leave the frontier posts standing and refrain from a jihad on a ruling from the ulema, that they would thereby be open to no reproach from the Almighty and on an assurance from the King that there was no menace there to their spiritual or material security.

3. The ulema then gave a ruling that telegraphs were not unlawful, and His Majesty declared that he was arranging for all of his subjects to be provided with religious teachers. Ibn Saud then seems to have told the tribes that they were responsible for the attack and massacre at Busaiya. This they admitted, adding that they would have proceeded against Feisal-ed-Doweish if they could have been sure that he would not have been sheltered in Iraq and that the posts would be demolished. The ulema supported this plea for the removal of the posts, but the King declined to discuss the matter in open meeting and said he would choose fifty from among them to whom he would explain everything. He then brought the meeting to an end with a finely confused reference to peace and war, upon which the assembly burst into tears, and having paid homage, retired for refreshment.


4. As I have already had the honour to report, no details of the proceedings at the private meeting have been published.


5. I have sent a copy of this despatch and its enclosure to His Majesty's High Commissioners for Iraq and Transjordan.


I have, &c.
H. G. JAKINS.

* Not printed.

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








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H. C. F. 16.
SECRET.
No. S.O. 2839
BUSHIRE RESIDENCY.
Reg. No. 2
Date 3.7.29.
CONFIDENTIAL RECORDS.
Baghdad, 22nd December, 1928.
By direction of His Excellency the High Commissioner for 'Iraq, a copy of correspondence as marked below is forwarded with compliments to :—
The Secretary to the Hon'ble
the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,
B U S H I R E .
Political Secretary
to H. E. The High Commissioner for 'Iraq.
Enclosures :— Telegram No. 624 dated the 21st of December, 1928, to the
Secretary of State for the Colonies, London.
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
Telegram. - Paraphrased. Ordinary.
From. - The High Commissioner, Baghdad.
To. - The Secretary of State for the Colonies,
London.

Repeated to:-


H.B.M.'s Consul & Agent,
Jiddah.


Dated. - 21st December, 1928.
No. - 624 London. 169/S Jiddah.


As recent rumours indicate the possibility of an early recrudescence of raiding on the part of the Mutair, the Government of 'Iraq request that Ibn Sa'ud should be asked by His Majesty's Government to despatch an adequate force under a responsible leader to Al Hafar, or some other place near his frontier, so as to prevent Najd tribes from raiding, authorising the leader to communicate direct with Capt. Glubb, the Administrative Inspector i/c Southern Desert. If you agree, will you authorise the Agent at Jiddah to despatch the message accordingly ? It might be more tactful not to make a direct reference to raiding by Najd tribes, but to suggest (as from His Majesty's Government) "with a view to avoiding undesirable incidents on the frontier", that Ibn Sa'ud should take action as proposed "in order to maintain over his tribes the same close control as the Government of 'Iraq is now exercising over its tribes".





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




















SGPS...621...1081...5,000...18 9 28.

Confidential.

No. S.O. 28

H. C. F. 16.

SECRETARIAT OF H. E. THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR 'IRAQ.

Baghdad, 5th January, 1929.

By direction of His Excellency the High Commissioner for 'Iraq, a copy of correspondence as marked below is forwarded with compliments to :—

The Secretary to the
Hon'ble the Political Resident in the
Persian Gulf, Bushire.

reference this Secretariat letter
No. S.O. 2653 dated the 24th of
November, 1928.


E. Farmer.
Political Secretary
to H. E. The High Commissioner for 'Iraq.


BUSHIRE RESIDENCY.
Reg. No. 35
Date 14.1.29.
CONFIDENTIAL RECORDS.



Enclosures :—



Confidential letter No. S.O. 24 dated the 5th of January, 1929, from the Counsellor to H. E. the High Commissioner for 'Iraq, Baghdad, to His Britannic Majesty's Agent & Consul, Jiddah, with enclosures, on the subject of Mutair tribesmen encamped in 'Iraq territory.

M. I.
5.











Translation of Letter No. 7/2 dated the 20th Jamad
ath-Thani 1347 (3rd December, 1926), from His Majesty 'Abdul
'Aziz bin 'Abdur Rahman al-Faisal as-Sa'ud, C.S.I.E., King
of Hijaz, Najd and Dependencies, to Lieut-Colonel G.C.J.
Barrett, C.S.I., C.I.E., H.M.'s Political Agent, Bahrain.



After compliments.

In reply to your letter No. 231-E dated the 10th Jamad
ath-Thani 1347, we request you to inform His Excellency the
High Commissioner for 'Iraq, that the Neutral Zone, the lands
and waters near it were and are at present encamping places
for the Muteir. That Bin Ashwan encamped in the place
referred to by His Excellency from the summer time. That
there is nothing in the action of Bin Ashwan or the encamping
of our other subjects in any place which is against the
Treaties and Agreements.

Usual endings.

U.









14
13
Translation of Letter No. 8/98 dated 2nd Rajab 1347 (15th December, 1928), from His Majesty Sir 'Abdul 'Aziz bin 'Abdur Rahman Faisal As Sa'ud, G.C.I.E., King of Hijaz, Najd and Dependencies, to Lieut. Colonel C.C.J. Barrett, G.S.I., C.I.E., Political Agent, Bahrain.



In reply to your letter No. 234-S dated 19th Jamad ath Thani 1347 (1st December, 1928), we beg you to inform His Excellency the High Commissioner for 'Iraq in addition to what we said in our previous letter No. 8/98 dated the 20th Jamad ath Thani 1347 (13th December, 1928), that the movement of our subjects from the place in which they were camping was only a customary one, in going out during part of the year in search of grazing and forage.



They go about freely to the watering places which they want at any time they like. It is one of their indisputable rights to which no one can object.



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













- 3 -

respect neighbouring relations, and to discharge international pledges, there would have been no cause whatever for these tribes to abandon their homes and run away elsewhere.



The future of the relations between the two countries will depend on the 'Iraq Government's conduct towards the tribes seeking refuge with that Government. If the 'Iraq Government discharged their undertaking not to afford protection to such tribes, they will have prepared the road for an understanding.


The Counsellor then referred to the statements made in certain newspapers as to the failure of the Riyadh conference recently called by His Majesty King Ibn Sa'ud. He definitely denied the truth of these statements, stating that he has received official intimation of the success of this conference and of its having realised the purpose for which it was held, adding that it was attended by several thousand tribal leaders and chiefs to whom the King explained the situation of the Government, indicated the channel in which its policy is progressing and the point which the negotiations have reached (or at which the negotiations have ended), and, finally, consulted their opinions as to the policy to be pursued in future for the welfare of the Arabian Peninsula as a whole.

Here the interview ended when the representative of Al-Siyasa thanked Shaikh Hafiz for his statements.

Our greatest hope is that relations between Hijaz, on one hand, and 'Iraq and Transjordan, on the other hand, may be consolidated in such manner as will insure the peace and security of all of them.

U.





Translation.


No. S.O. 23


The Residency,
Baghdad, 5 January, 1929.

Your Majesty,

After compliments,

I should be grateful if Your Majesty would refer to the correspondence ending with Your Majesty's letter No. 8/98 dated Rajab 2nd 1347 (15th December, 1928) to the Political Agent at Bahrain, on the subject of certain Muttair tribesmen who had camped in 'Iraq territory. I must confess that I found it difficult to understand Your Majesty's letter No. 7/2 dated 20th Jamad ath-Thani 1347 (3rd December, 1928), which seemed to imply that the Muttair in question were either in or close to the neutral zone, whereas in fact they were at a distance of forty miles from it. Your Majesty's letter of Rajab 2nd has, however, made it clear that although Your Majesty is aware that the Muttair were in 'Iraq territory, you had no objection to their presence there. As, however, the tone of both Your Majesty's letters leads me to suppose that Your Majesty has misunderstood the object of the 'Iraq Government in enquiring whether the Muttair had come into 'Iraq with Your Majesty's permission, I wish to explain what that object was. Your Majesty cannot have forgotten that you yourself, as a condition precedent to the punishment by you of Faisal al Dawish, demanded that the 'Iraq Government should not give refuge to any of the guilty tribesmen who might take refuge from your wrath in 'Iraq. The 'Iraq Government readily gave the required assurance, and consequently, when they heard that a number of the Muttair had come into 'Iraq, they deemed it their duty to enquire from Your Majesty whether they had done so with your permission, in order that, if they had not received that permission, they might be removed from 'Iraq in accordance with the promise of the 'Iraq Government to Your Majesty. The Muttair returned to Najd before the





- 2 -

the receipt of Your Majesty's reply, but one of them, Ibn Ashwan, has since led a raiding party into 'Iraq. Fortunately his movements were known and a party of aeroplanes forced him to retire into Najd before he had actually raided any of the 'Iraq tribes.

In view of the prompt action taken by the 'Iraq Government, on learning of the presence of these Mutair, to fulfil their promises to Your Majesty, I am distressed to learn that a representative of Your Majesty has been making unfounded statements in respect of these very people. The Egyptian newspaper 'As Siyasa', in its issue of December 3rd, 1928, published an interview with Sheikh Hafiz Wahba in which he stated that the Mutair under Ibn Ashwan were about to take refuge in 'Iraq from the punishment which Your Majesty insisted upon inflicting on them. He went on to say that the future of the relations between the two countries would depend upon the 'Iraq Government's treatment of these people, and appeared to hint that they were unlikely to fulfil their promises.


Sheikh Hafiz Wahba's statement as to the reason which led Ibn Ashwan and his followers to enter 'Iraq is so utterly at variance with Your Majesty's two letters to the Political Agent at Bahrain, that I feel sure that he must have made it without Your Majesty's knowledge, and I presume that Your Majesty will take steps to ensure that, in future, he does not make statements to the press which not only cast doubts upon the good faith of the 'Iraq Government, but which are in direct opposition to Your Majesty's own official statements.

Usual ending.

(Sd) H. Dobbs.

High Commissioner for 'Iraq.

His Majesty 'Abdul 'Aziz ibn 'Abdul
Rahman al Faisal al Sa'ud, S.C.I.E.,
The King of the Hijaz and of Najd
and its Dependencies.





61/14

20 1929

H. C. F. 16.

SGPRS...621...1081...5,000...18 9 28.

Secret.

No. S.O. 33

SECRETARIAT OF H. E. THE HIGH
COMMISSIONER FOR 'IRAQ.

Baghdad, 7th January, 1929.

By direction of His Excellency the High Commissioner for 'Iraq, a copy of correspondence as marked
below is forwarded with compliments to :—

The Secretary to the
Hon'ble the Political Resident
in the Persian Gulf, Bushire.


BUSHIRE RESIDENCY
Reg. No. 36
Date: 14.1.29.
CONFIDENTIAL RECORDS.


Political Secretary
to H. E. The High Commissioner for 'Iraq.

Enclosures :—

Telegram No. 11 dated the 4th of January, 1929, from the High
Commissioner, Baghdad, to the Secretary of State for the
Colonies, London, regarding Najd situation.

M. I.
7.





Telegram. - Paraphrased. Important.
From. e The High Commissioner, Baghdad.
To. - The Secretary of State for the Colonies, London.

Repeated to:-


Foreign, Delhi.


H.B.M's Agent & Consul,
Jiddah.

Dated. - 4th January, 1929.
No. - 11 London. Delhi & Jiddah 3/S.

The following is a summary of events leading to the present Najd situation.

1. Till December 7th reports mainly through the Political Agent Kuwait indicated that the Riyadh conference had broken up without reaching a decision as regards the policy towards 'Iraq. Ibn Sa'ud had, however, forbidden raiding for two months pending further discussion with British representative. Al Dawish, and possibly other important Akhwan shaikhs had, however, not obeyed the summons to Riyadh and it seemed doubtful whether they would agree to two months truce.
2. On December 7th telegram No. 1234 from the Political Resident at Bushire was received stating that Ibn Sa'ud was detained in Najd. This meant abandonment of the meeting with the Political Agent, Bahrain, previously arranged and suggested that Ibn Sa'ud was having difficulty in enforcing his orders.
3. Simultaneously rumours began to circulate in the desert that the Mutair contemplated a resumption of raids against 'Iraq and the Dhafir sections who had crossed into 'Iraq hurried back to Najd on receipt of a warning.
4. During the second week of December four small raiding or reconnoitring parties of the Mutair were reported in the neutral zone and the neighbourhood.
5. On December 16th Royal Air Force Intelligence in the desert reported that Dawish had circularised Akhwan shaikhs





- 2 -


shaikhs inviting them to join a raid on 'Iraq and that Ibn Humaid (Ataibah) had written to Ibn Sa'ud that he intended to join. (At this stage I despatched telegram No. 624 dated December 21st, inviting co-operation of Ibn Sa'ud, Agent Jiddah did not take action for fear of hurting Ibn Sa'ud's feelings). On the same date Kuwait telegraphed a report that Dawish had informed Ibn Sa'ud that he proposed to raid the Dahamshah in 'Iraq immediately. The Dahamshah also received warning ~~that~~ on the same date that Muhsin al Firm (Harb) was concentrating his tribesmen for a large raid on 'Iraq. Simultaneously Jazza ibn Mijlad, a Dahamshah shaikh, stated he had received a letter from Ibn Sa'ud ordering him to return to Najd to which he had not replied. It was then commonly reported that Ibn Sa'ud had sanctioned raid on 'Iraq Anaizah and that Dawish, Ibn Humaid and Al Firm had informed Ibn Sa'ud th at they intended to raid the Anaizah.


6. On December 30th the Political Agent at Kuwait telegraphed a report, subsequently confirmed, received by the Shaikh of Kuwait that Ajman tribesmen were concentrating at Jaryah (south of Kuwait) for a large raid probably on 'Iraq and that Dawish was joining them with a Mutair force.

7. On December 29th an attempted raid by Mutair near Jumaimah was repulsed by aircraft (see my telegram No. 632 dated December 30th).

8. On January 1st a raiding party of 30 Mutair camelmen and 6 horsemen attacked 'Iraq Zaiyad tribesmen in neutral zone. The latter beat off the raiders and put them to flight. Five Mutair prisoners were taken.

9. On January 2nd a shepherd tribesman reported that he had seen 1,000 camelmen 30 miles N.E. of Jumaimah in 'Iraq territory.





Telegram

Code

- 3 -

territory. An aerial reconnaissance is now investigating.


10. On 3rd January an Anaiza scout arrived from Gaisuma, forty five miles within Najd territory south-west of Jumaimah, interviewed Captain Glubb, reported raiders from Harb and Shammar collecting at that place from all directions to attack Anaiza. Scout met messenger from Ibn Sa'ud with letters to Dahamshah shaikhs warning them to return to Najd or flee to the Euphrates. Glubb telegraphs only way to avoid disaster to Anaiza is for aircraft to reconnoitre Gaisuma, but I have informed him this is out of question.


11. All evidence point to possibility of raiding on large scale in near future in which Mutair, Shammar, Harb, Ataiyah and Ajman tribes may participate. Immediate threat is against 'Iraq Anaiza in Wadian area, but concentration at Jaryah also threatens 'Iraq tribes in southern desert.


King and Cabinet are in panic and anticipate terrific catastrophe. If invasion on anticipated scale takes place I see no other plan than either to repeat last year's measures of operations within Najd or marine blockade. I beg that His Britannic Majesty's Government will take future policy into immediate consideration. In any event I trust that immediate request be made to Ibn Sa'ud to co-operate with British and 'Iraq authorities by restraining intending raiders.

Reference is to my telegrams Nos. 3 and 9 of the 2nd and 3rd January respectively.

U.









61/14

24
(29)

S 1955-2,000-9-14-(E2) Spl-Resdt P G 118

CONFIDENTIAL. No. 7-S. of 1929.


Forwarded to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, for information, in continuation of ^{letter} ~~with reference to~~ this office ^{telegram} ~~endorsement~~ No. 470-S, dated the 22nd December 1928


By order,
[Signature]
For Secretary
~~Second Assistant~~ to the Political
Resident in the Persian Gulf.


Bushire:
The 19th January 1929.

List of Papers.

1.	Baghdad telegram No. 171-S, dated 30th December 1928.	Vn. 7-1
2.	Kuwait " " nil " " " "	
3.	" " " 522-S " 31st " "	
4.	Baghdad " " 2-S " 2nd January 1929.	p. 1
5.	Kuwait " " 5 " 6th " "	p. 3
6.	" " " 6 " 8th " "	p. 4
7.	" " " 8 " 11th " "	p. 5
8.	" " " 11 " 13th " "	p. 6
9.	" " " 12 " 16th " "	p. 18









61/14

26

31

Telegram Code

From Political Kuwait

To Resident Bushire

Repeated High Commissioner for 'Iraq and Consul, Basra.

No. 15

Dated and received 21st January 1929.

IMMEDIATE. Rumour has just reached here that Ibn Hithlain is on his way to raid Muntafik near Jabal Sanam. The raid is expected to take place today, Monday.


- POLITICAL -

PR. 21/1

21/1

P.C. & Rural

21/1





122.
22/1/29

27
(32)

Telegram	Code
From	Political Kuwait
To	Resident Bushire
Repeated	High Commissioner for 'Iraq and H.M.'s Consul, Basra.

No.17

Dated and received 21st January 1929.

24

IMMEDIATE. My 16. Colonel Watson who left here shortly ~~after~~ before news of raiders was received, for Basra has just come back. At 1340 hours when his car got to Shaib Abu Saham in Abetih, 30 miles beyond Jahrah and 26 short of Safwan, they came up on raiders in 2 parties - one of 20 camels with 2 men on each to their left and a much larger party in front which was too far to estimate accurately. The raiders to their left opened fire on the car which turned and got away.

- Political -


PR.


22/1


22/1

P.C. & Nurse

22/1









61/14 123 22/1/29 29 (30)

Telegram	Code
From	Political Kuwait
To	Resident Bushire
Repeated	High Commissioner for 'Iraq and H.M.'s Consul, Basrah.

No.16
Dated 21st (received 22nd) January 1929.


URGENT. My No.16. I have obtained the following details. The news was brought by a Salabi who was gathering truffles in Qira-al-Marru to north west of Jahrah and was advised to leave the neighbourhood by a Rashidi who told him Ibn Mithlain was out raiding and that he was one of his scouts. He said party would spend tonight at Umm al Amarah and raid tomorrow morning, Tuesday, (not today, as I originally heard) and that their objective was 'Iraq shepherds and others in north west part of Kuwait territory.

Nothing is known regarding the reliability of either man.

Shaikh has advised all tribes who can to close in on Jahrah.

- POLITICAL -

P.S. to Muscat
27/1





61/14

128
23/1/29.

30
35

Telegram Code

From High Commissioner, Baghdad

To Secretary of State for the Colonies, No. 36

No. 36

Repeated Resident, Bushire, No. 28.

No. 28

Dated and received 22nd January 1929.

IMPORTANT. I received reports from Kuwait yesterday indicating raiding party Ibn Mithlain of Al Ajman tribe would probably raid near Jebel Sanam on 'Iraq-Kuwait frontier this morning. Aeroplanes and armoured cars reconnoitres were arranged for dawn. In the meantime 2 motoring parties on Basra-Kuwait road met raiders yesterday. First Colonel Watson coming from Kuwait to Basra met 2 parties raiding 26 miles within Kuwait territory and was fired upon but got away. Second Crane and his son with Bilkert, American Missionaries, on their way from Basra to Kuwait met raiders 15 miles within Kuwait territory. Bilkert was killed but others escaped back to Zobair. Aeroplanes will now reconnoitre across Kuwait frontier.


- HIGH COMMISSIONER
FOR 'IRAQ -


PR. Report 23/1. 23/1 *****


action held up. 23/1


P.C. & Hussar -


23/1
































Telegram P.

From Political Agent, Kuwait,

To Political Resident, Bushire.

No. 27.

Dated (and received) 23rd January 1929.

Begins. "would appreciate any action possible in connection with killing reported by ikhwan of American, Henry MILLETT, yesterday afternoon, fifteen miles south of Sabam, in Kuwait territory. Am also wiring to His Excellency the ^{Sheikh} ~~Shah~~ of Kuwait." Ends.

The foregoing telegram, dated 22nd January, was received from the Consul for the United States of America at Baghdad.

This was received when I thought he was safe, and reply was sent accordingly. When I knew he was dead, I despatched the following telegram, dated 22nd instant, begins :-

"I am sorry to learn that Millett was killed. H. E. the ~~Shah~~ had already taken all steps in his power regarding raiders. He expresses great regret at incident.


Has reference to my telegram ~~of 22nd instant~~ No. 20." Ends.


His Excellency informed me that he would reply in similar terms.


- POLITICAL.

Reputed to India.

Jb









"ملف (VIII D 55 61/14) العلاقات بين نجد والعراق" [٣٤و] (١٩٨٢/٩١)

SGPS...621...1081...5,000...18 9 23.

H. C. F. 16.

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECRETARIAT OF H. E. THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR IRAQ.

No. S.O. 76

Baghdad, 12 January, 1929.

By direction of His Excellency the High Commissioner for Iraq, a copy of correspondence as marked below is forwarded with compliments to :—

The Secretary to the
Hon'ble the Political Resident
in the Persian Gulf, Bushire.


BUSHIRE RESIDENCY.
Reg. No. 23.1.29
Date.
CONFIDENTIAL RECORDS.


Political Secretary
to H. E. The High Commissioner for Iraq.

Enclosures :—

Letter No. S.O. 75 dated 12/1/1929, to H.B.M.'s Acting Agent and Consul, Jiddah, together with a translation of the letter addressed to His Majesty King Ibn Sa'ud, regarding the imprisonment of Ibn Juraiyid in Hail.

T.C.





CONFIDENTIAL.

No. S.O. 75

Secretariat of H.M. the High
Commissioner for 'Iraq,

Baghdad, 12th January, 1929.

Sir,

I am directed to enclose a letter which
His Excellency the High Commissioner would be glad
if you would transmit to His Majesty King Ibn Sa'ud.
I also enclose a translation of the letter for your
information.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your most obedient servant,

(Sd.) B. H. Bourdillon


Counsellor to


H.M. the High Commissioner for 'Iraq.


His Britannic Majesty's
Acting Agent and Consul,


JEDDAH.


T.C.













اعرض على مكتبة قطر الرقمية: http://www.qdl.qa/العربية/archive/81055/vdc_100023663086.0x0000063







SGPS... 621... 1081... 5,000... 18 9 23.

6/14

41a

U8

H. C. F. 16.

SECRETARIAT OF H. E. THE HIGH
COMMISSIONER FOR 'IRAQ.

Confidential.
No. 50/82

Baghdad, 16 January, 1929.

By direction of His Excellency the High Commissioner for 'Iraq, a copy of correspondence as marked below is forwarded with compliments to :—

The Secretary to the Hon'ble
the Political Resident in the
Persian Gulf, Bushire.

reference this Secretariat
letter No. S.O. 33 dated the 7th
of January, 1929.


BUSHIRE RESIDENCY.
Reg. No. 59
Date 28.1.29.
CONFIDENTIAL RECORDS.


Political Secretary
Political Secretary
to H. E. The High Commissioner for 'Iraq.


Enclosures :—


Telegram No. 22 dated the 14th of January, 1929, from the High Commissioner, Baghdad, to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, London.

M. I.









Telegram Code
From Political Kuwait
To Resident Bushire
Repeated High Commissioner for 'Iraq and Basra.
No.28
Dated 24th (received 25th) January 1929.

My No.25. According to the latest information received raiders camped evening 22nd January between Saddah and Umm Ruus after sending on plundered sheep. They went on at dawn, hoping to reach Maraj as Sauban, 15 miles north-west by north of Wabrah, last night Wednesday. The Sheikh considers Kuwait-'Iraq road safe again.


- POLITICAL -


PR.


26/1


P.C. to Minister


26/1

















































61/14

167
29/29

49-c
(57)

Telegram	Code
From	Highcoma, Baghdad.
To	Political Kuwait
Repeated	Resident Bushire
No.37	

Dated and received the 28th January 1929.

IMPORTANT. Your No.31. Informant from Nejd reports that Ibn Humaid arrived Artāwiyah 8 days ago en route to raid 'Iraq. It is said that his intention was to raid simultaneously with Ibn Mithlain. Jawaim tribesmen also report having seen strange horsemen near Shiqqat Al Zikhaih who fled on their approach. Possibly scouts of raiding party.


-HIGHCOMA-


PR.


air
29/1



5/7/29



x Jawairan











































186
31/1/29.

55
(67)

Telegram Code

From Political Kuwait

To Resident Bushire

Repeated High Commissioner for 'Iraq and
Administrative Inspector, Basrah.

No. 39

Dated 30th (received 31st) January 1929.


My No. 35. I have just now seen Aijla Al
Falih As Sadun who arrived from Riyadh this morning Wed-
nesday. He has no very recent news, however, as he left
there about the beginning of January and travelled by way
of Hasa. He says relations between Bin Saud and Ikhwan
are very ~~strengthened~~ ^{strained} and sees no prospect of reconcilia-
tion. Qatif and Jubail are being fortified and seem
(x?) . He heard rumour on the way that Ibn Humaid
was going raiding against 'Iraq - according to one he
was to leave Ghatghat on 31st January.


- POLITICAL -


PR. 31/1


P.C. Atkinson

70









Telegram P.

61/14 57

From Political Agent, Kuwait.

To Political Resident, Bushire.

No. 44.

Dated 1st (received 2nd) February 1929.

IMMEDIATE.

From American Consul at Baghdad, begins :-

"Your telegram of 22nd January, many thanks.

"Can you furnish me with detailed information as to action taken to apprehend and punish these responsible for killing Bilkert and is any further action still possible?" Ends.

The foregoing telegram was received by me through H.M. the High Commissioner at Baghdad.

I propose to reply :


"All available horsemen were ordered out by the Shaikh from Jahrah, where they were stationed, as soon as he received information that raiders were in his territory, and before even he heard of Bilkert's death. Raiders retired into Nejd with what booty they had collected, and horsemen did not come into contact with them. It is not possible for the Shaikh of Kuwait to do anything further as raiders have left his territory. He brought the matter to the knowledge of Bin Saud, whose subjects raiders were".


Do you agree ? Actually oral message about occurrence was sent to Bin Saud by the Shaikh by messengers he was despatching to Riyadh.


Has reference being Ul. of 23rd Jan., No 17.
- POLITICAL.


P.C. 4 CO, 577. J.


7/2/29




















CONFIDENTIAL.

British Residency and Consulate-General,
Bushire, 5th February 1929.

No. 6.

Sir,

In continuation of my despatch No. 4 of the

-----				28th ultimo,
1. Baghdad telegram No. 37, dated 28th January.				I have the
2. Kuwait " 35, " 28th "				honour to
3. " " 39, " 30th "				forward for
4. " " 43, " 1st February.				the informa-
5. " " 44, " 1st "				tion of His
6. Bushire " 54, " 2nd "				Majesty's
7. Kuwait " 45, " 2nd "				

Government copies of the marginally noted telegrams.

I have the honour to be,


Sir,


Your most obedient,

humble servant,

Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

His Majesty's Secretary of State
for the Colonies,
Colonial Office,
London.







2

Enclosure 1 in No. 1.

Ibn Saud to Mr. Stonehewer-Bird.

(Translation.)
(After compliments.)

WE have received your Excellency's letter in which you enquired about some of the points suggested by us regarding the arbitration. We are glad to acquaint the British Government of the following explanations:—

1. The object of paragraphs 1 and 2 of the twelfth clause of our letter is that one party only and not two should be appointed to the Commission of Arbitration opposite our representatives. So that if Iraq is going to select the arbitrators the British Government will be neutral in the Commission of Arbitration, and will not delegate anyone on their behalf.

2. We explain the object of paragraph 4 of the twelfth clause of our letter referred to as follows: The purpose of the Commission of Arbitration will be to look into the disagreement which has fallen between the two parties with a view to giving a judgment on it. And as on the day of Uquair we did not consent to give up our territories which have been annexed to Iraq, except under overwhelming circumstances, and that this ceding was subject to the condition that there should be no building on the lands which we had ceded, and as the British Government has refused to accept this as the meaning of the third clause of the Protocol of Uquair (as mentioned in your Excellency's letter of the 16th November, 1928), our yielding those lands conditional on the meaning of the third clause will be without effect. The dispute will consequently be not about the third clause of the Protocol of Uquair alone, but about the first and third clauses.

We therefore request that we and Iraq should approach the arbitrators with a view to considering the question of the frontiers and the question of the third clause, which arose out of the first clause.

With respects.

(Seal of Ibn Saud.)

11.8.1347 (23.1.1929).

Enclosure 2 in No. 1.

Mr. Stonehewer-Bird to Ibn Saud.

(After respectful compliments.)

Your Majesty,

Jeddah, February 5, 1929.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Majesty's letter of the 23rd January, in which your Majesty was good enough to explain certain proposals with regard to arbitration.

2. I fear that I must trouble your Majesty once again on the subject of conditions 1 and 2 under paragraph 12 of your Majesty's letter of the 12th December.


3. It is, I gather, your Majesty's proposal that arbitrators should be chosen in equal numbers by Nejd and Iraq. I venture to point out that arbitration in these conditions could have no hope of success. Provision must, if Nejd and Iraq are to choose one or more arbitrators each, be made for the selection of a neutral arbitrator, as otherwise a majority vote could not be assured. The usual practice is for the Governments concerned to arrange the appointment by agreement of an additional or neutral arbitrator. The parties to the dispute should, moreover, agree in advance to accept the decision of the majority of the arbitrators.


4. I am authorised to suggest as an alternative course for your Majesty's consideration the appointment of a single arbitrator of high repute to be selected by agreement between the parties to the dispute.


5. I should be grateful if your Majesty would be good enough to explain the precise meaning of condition 6 in paragraph 12 of letter No. 31/12.

Respects.

F. H. W. STONEHEWER-BIRD.







[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government.]

EASTERN (ARABIA).

February 26, 1929.

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 3.

[E 1033/3/91]

No. 1.

Mr. Stonehewer Bird to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received February 26.)

(No. 43.)
Sir,

Jeddah, February 7, 1929.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a translation of a letter from Ibn Saud on the subject of the recent bombing of Nejd subjects in Iraq and the rumour of a Nejd incursion on a large scale.

2. Ibn Saud writes that he would have preferred that the information contained in Mr. Jakins's notes of the 5th January, of which copies were transmitted under printed despatches Nos. 11 and 12 of the 6th January, had emanated from His Majesty's Government, who verify the information they receive, rather than from Captain Glubb, who, he cannot help feeling, acts on the frontier in a manner contrary to the interests and desires of His Majesty's Government, thus disturbing the good relations of the two countries and increasing the difficulties of the situation. The report of a raid by Ibn Ashwan appears, Ibn Saud continues, to have been untrue. Captain Glubb based his unjustifiable aggression on Nejd subjects, who were proceeding to pasture their animals in the desert, on unreliable reports from Bedouins. Three men and twelve camels were killed on this occasion. Ibn Saud protests and demands compensation.

3. The King traces the report that he had sanctioned the perpetration of a raid into Iraq on a large scale to Captain Glubb, who, by spreading such rumours on the frontier and reporting them to His Majesty's Government, succeeds by the resultant increased movement of forces on the frontier in inflaming the passions of the Nejd. Ibn Saud regards Captain Glubb's activities as a most dangerous menace to peace.

4. When negotiations with Sir Gilbert Clayton were broken off, the situation in Nejd itself and on the frontier was, Ibn Saud states, most critical; he had, indeed, the gravest doubts of his ability to maintain the direction of affairs. Nevertheless, he did not relax his endeavours to maintain peace throughout the frontier area. He spent considerable sums of money with this object. As the result of his efforts no incidents have occurred in which his subjects have been involved. He assembled in conference the Amirs, ulema and chiefs of Nejd; all were in complete agreement that the erection of the frontier posts was a breach of treaty, and that their maintenance constituted a grave danger not only to the land and people but to the sovereignty of Nejd. Duty dictated that every possible measure should be adopted to effect their removal. Ibn Saud asserts that he did his best to convince the people of the necessity for patience and the continuance of his policy of working for the removal of the offending posts by peaceful methods. Some of his hearers were guided by his views; others considered that to continue a policy of patience would merely aggravate the present danger to Nejd. He is endeavouring to induce these latter to be patient and deliberate, though, as His Majesty's Government knows, he himself believes them to be right in their views that the posts are illegal.

5. It is, Ibn Saud states, at this critical juncture of Nejd affairs, when he is using his utmost endeavours to maintain peace and security, that King Faisal pays a visit to the frontier, Captain Glubb executes disturbing movements, and the people of Transjordan continue to use the Jauf area as a field for plunder. If, therefore, his earnest endeavours in the cause of peace do not succeed in preventing a movement against Iraq, he will not be to blame. He wishes His Majesty's Government to know of the efforts which he has been making, and to remind them that, as he informed Sir Gilbert Clayton, he cannot accept responsibility for the results of the breakdown of the negotiations nor of Iraq's insistence on maintaining the posts.

6. The King's letter is, in face of the provocation of which he feels himself to be the victim by King Faisal's untimely excursion to the frontier and the action which resulted on Captain Glubb's apparently unfounded report of an incursion *en masse* into Iraq, decidedly moderate in tone. He does not so much inveigh against King Faisal and Captain Glubb as seek to convince His Majesty's Government that a repetition of the incidents complained of will result in his inability to curb, as he

[707 cc-3]



has hitherto been able to do, the passions of his subjects, and that the responsibility for what may consequently occur should not be borne by him. The letter is also interesting in that it supplies what is without doubt an authentic version of the proceedings of the Riyadh Conference. The King does not pretend, as did the writer of the "Um-el-Kura" version, that the chiefs and ulema were unanimous in accepting the King's views. There still remain, Ibn Saud states, those whom he has not been able to convince that a policy of patience and deliberation is in the best interests of Nejd.

7. I have addressed a copy of this despatch and its enclosure to His Majesty's High Commissioner for Iraq.

I have, &c.

F. H. W. STONEHEWER-BIRD.

Enclosure in No. 1.

Ibn Saud to Mr. Stonehewer-Bird.

(Translation.)

WE have received your letters dated 24.7.1347 (5th January, 1929), and we beg you to convey to the British Government our reply to the two letters as follows:—


1. It would have interested us to receive the news your Excellency related concerning Mr. Glubb from the British Government, who, we believe, test the information which reaches them instead of from Mr. Glubb, who, so far as we believe, acts on the frontiers against the wishes and contrary to the interests of the British Government, thus disturbing the clear relations between the two countries and increasing the difficulties of the situation.

2. The raid reported to have been made by Ibn Ashwan is apparently not true, and the aggression of Mr. Glubb on those Arabs of our subjects who were proceeding for pasturage in the desert was an unjustifiable aggression, and was based on the reports of some Bedouins in whose statements no reliance can be placed. As is mentioned in the letter, the result was that three men were killed and twelve camels destroyed. We protest against this action and claim the necessary compensation.

3. As to the rumour reported to the British Government to the effect that we have allowed some of the tribes to make a raid on a large scale against Iraq, this, we believe, is one of the reports which Mr. Glubb spreads at the frontiers in order to kindle the fire on both sides. For, on the one hand, he excites the people of Nejd by his movements and assemblies, and, on the other, sends disturbing news to the British Government about the Nejd people in order that they [? His Majesty's Government] may make increased movements and preparations, consequently increasing the excitation of the Nejd people, and thus making the outbreak of bloody events inevitable. This action, as the British Government will realise is one of the most dangerous and repulsive menaces to peace on the frontiers.

4. It is beyond dispute that when the negotiations between us and his Excellency General Clayton were broken off owing to a failure to arrive at any agreement, the position in Nejd and at the frontiers was dangerous to the last degree, and it was to our belief almost impossible that we should succeed maintaining the direction of affairs, but we pursued the matter and exerted our best endeavours to maintain peace throughout the vicinity of the frontier. We spent very considerable sums of money in this way until we prevented the occurrence of any incident. In spite of the critical position our subjects were not concerned in any incident whatever on the frontier after the breakdown of the negotiations. We gathered the Amirs of Nejd, its ulema and chiefs, and the thoughtful people there, and all completely agreed that those inauspicious posts were built in contravention of the agreement, that there could be no content while they remained, and that duty dictated that whatever was possible should be done to remove them. They found that they were one of the greatest dangers threatening not only Nejd and its people, but also the Nejd realm.

We did our best in conference to convince the people of the necessity for patience and deliberation in the matter and for the continuation of peaceful endeavours to remove those posts. Some of them were guided by our views, others considered that to remain patient concerning them would increase the danger to Nejd. These people are those we are seeking to persuade to be patient and deliberate although we believe, as the British Government know, that they in their insistence are right to consider the building of those inauspicious posts unlawful.



3

5. This is the position in Nejd, and at the time when we are exerting our best endeavours to maintain peace and security we see the King of Iraq come to the vicinity of the frontier and work to rouse the tribes and to assemble them, and we see the disturbing movements of Mr. Glubb, the result of which we inform the British Government is highly dangerous.


6. We therefore say that if the endeavours we are making do not result in preventing a movement against Iraq pending settlement of matters in a peaceful manner, the cause of this will be not the people of Nejd, but (1) the King of Iraq by his last journey, (2) Mr. Glubb by his grave movements, and (3) the people of Transjordan who have made the Jauḥ area a field for plunder all along the line and at all times.


7. We wish the British Government to know that we made these endeavours to keep peace in the time past and we informed General Clayton that we are not responsible for the results consequent on the breaking-up of the negotiations and the insistence of the Iraq Government in breaking their agreement concerning the building the guard posts. This is what we beg you to communicate to the British Government.


(Respects.)


(Seal of Ibn Saud.)


11.8.1347 (*January 22, 1929*).














CONFIDENTIAL.

British Residency and Consulate-General,
Bushire, 11th February 1929.

No. 7.

Sir,

In continuation of my despatch No. 6 of the 5th

----- instant I have the
ix Kuwait telegram No. 55 of 8th ' honour to forward
February 1929. ' for the information
----- of His Majesty's
Government a copy of the telegram noted in the margin.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your most obedient,



humble servant,


Mc



for Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.


Ms


His Majesty's Secretary of State
for the Colonies,
Colonial Office, Downing Street,
London.
















Dated and received the 15th February 1929.


Sneikh of Kuwait has just received information from a reliable source that big raid is just about to take place. One party consisting of contingent led by Ibn Hithlain, Ibn Shuqair and ~~xxx~~ Fuji, was at Maraj-as-Sauban yesterday evening, Thursday, is due to arrive at Umm-al-Hiran 60 miles S.W. of Juhra, today, and intends to raid tribe(s) in northern Shaqq and Abatih area - presumably tomorrow morning, Saturday. At same time Dawish with another party is going to raid up Eatin.


POLITICAL

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61/14

67

85

Telegram P.

From H.K. the High Commissioner, Baghdad.

To H.M.'s. Secretary for the Colonies, London,
No. 61.


Repeated Political Resident, Bushire, No. 14-S.


Political Agent, Kuwait, No. 14-S.

Dated 12th (received 13th) February 1929.

In spite of raid of 21st January many Iraq tribes still graze in Kuwait territory where grazing is excellent. Grazing in Iraq is bad and ^{to} bring them back would involve very great loss. Air Officer Commanding is sending occasional reconnaissances over Kuwait territory, but without proper organisation of tribes these do not afford adequate protection. Organisation is impossible with so many mixed tribes unless GLUBB himself visits them, and this I have so far forbidden him to do as I do not take permission for air and armoured car reconnaissances to cover visits to Kuwait territory by Iraq Government officials. nor do Air Officer Commanding and I consider that stay of armoured cars with tribes in Kuwait territory for period of several days for which also Glubb has asked is covered by this permission. I suggest permission for occasional visits by Glubb and desert police to Iraq tribes in Kuwait be immediately obtained from Shaikh of Kuwait and that Air Officer Commanding be authorised to treat permission already received from him for reconnaissances by armoured cars as covering their stay for period of several days with Iraq tribes.

- HIGH COMMISSIONER.





61/14

(26)

Telegram P.

From Political Agent, Kuwait.

To Political Resident, Bushire.

No. 64.


Dated 13th (received 14th) February 1929.


Shaiikh of Kuwait fully realises danger of Iraq tribes and I am sure that he will raise no objection to GLUBB's visiting those tribes or to armoured cars stopping for several days at a time in his territory for their protection.

I think however that latter should not include Iraq army patrol cars but should preferably be confined to British armoured cars and armed Fords, which ~~must~~ should only enter Kuwait territory when in pursuit of raiders.--
vide my telegram of 24th ^{January} ~~July~~, No. 29, in this connection.

Foregoing refers to Baghdad telegram of No. 14-S.

- POLITICAL.





Telegram P.

From Political Resident, Bushire.

To H.E. the High Commissioner for Iraq,
Baghdad, No. 110.

(H.M.'s. Secretary of State for the Colonies,
London, No. 3.

Repeated (Political Agent, Kuwait, No. 110,

No. 110/3.


Dated 16th February 1929.


Colonel More gives me to understand that the
Shaikh of Kuwait will not raise objection to GLUEB's
visiting these tribes or to armoured cars stopping
in his territory for several days at a time as proposed.

It would, however, be preferable that these should
be British armoured cars and that Iraq Army patrol cars
should only enter Kuwait in actual pursuit.

Reference is to your telegram No. 14-S.

- RESIDENT.





CONFIDENTIAL.

69a
(33)

British Residency and Consulate-General,

Bushire, 18th February 1929.

No. 8.

Sir,

Further to my despatch No. 7 of the 11th

-----	February 1929 I have
1. Baghdad telegram No. 60, dated 11th	the honour to forward
February 1929.	
2. Kuwait " No. 62, dated 12th	for the information
February 1929.	
3. " No. 67, dated 15th	of His Majesty's
February 1929.	
4. " No. 71, dated 17th	Government a copy of
February 1929.	the telegrams noted
-----	in the margin.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your most obedient,

humble servant,

5

Mc

for Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,


7/5


His Majesty's Secretary of State


for the Colonies,


Colonial Office,


LONDON.






















Telegram Code
From Highcomma, Baghdad
To Secretary of State for the Colonies, London,
No. 77
Repeated Jeddah, Kuwait and Bushire. No. 75
Dated 21st (received 22nd) February 1929.


Following summary of recent reports of Akhwan movements indicate probability of big raid in near future on 'Iraq tribal encampments in southern desert.

1. 12th February. Political Agent Kuwait reported that Dawish having composed to quarrel with Ataibah tribe had unfurled his standard at Jarab 55 miles N.E. of Buraida and had summoned all Akhwan for big raid.
2. On 14th February Glubb received similar report which added that Ibn Humaid was concentrating Akhwan at Jaala 30 miles from Buraida for a Jihad.
3. On 15th February Political Agent Kuwait reported that two large raiding parties had started out, one under Ibn Hithlain (Ajman) which intended to attack 'Iraq tribes in the north of Kuwait on 16th, the second under Dawish which was advancing towards the neutral zone.
Note. It has since been reported that Ibn Hithlain's party reached southern Kuwait border but learning that aeroplanes were out patrolling postponed the raid and are near Safa awaiting a more favourable opportunity.
4. In the meanwhile Mutair, Shammar and Dhafir sections grazing within and to south of neutral zone moved rapidly away to S.E. and S.W.
5. On 17th February Glubb learned that Mutair shepherds had received warning that Dawish and Ibn Humaid were in Bashuk area and were moving to attack 'Iraq tribes at Abtiyah about 20th February.

Reports from different sources as to Ibn Saud's









Telegram P.

From H.E. the High Commissioner for Iraq,
Baghdad.

To H.M.'s. Secretary of State for the Colonies,
London, No. 78.



Repeated Political Resident, Bushire, No. 19-S.



Dated 21st (received 22nd) February 1929.

IMMEDIATE.

There is no grazing or water in Iraq desert for flocks of shepherd tribes now concentrated 50 miles south of BUSAIYAH: they will suffer very heavy mortality unless they get at least one month more of good grazing before retiring to summer quarters. Good grazing is obtainable only in neutral zone or Kuwait. In view of general uncertainty of situation and of reported concentration of Ikhwan tribes at Jarab, impossible to allow tribes to graze either in neutral zone or in Kuwait without adequate protection. Paragraph 13 (2) of Summary of Debb's memorandum on Desert Defence — vide despatch* Secret A of 12th October 1928 — provides for entry of Iraq army ~~XXXX~~ and police cars into neutral zone in situations such as that which have now arisen, but does not provide for entry of armoured cars into neutral zone. Air Officer Commanding does not consider armed cars of police and army safe without further protection of armed cars so long as there is serious danger of raid. On the other hand neutral zone is nearer ~~than~~ than Kuwait, and move to latter place may involve considerable casualties to stock. Also it ~~appears~~ ^{appears} from Bushire telegram dated the 16th February that there may be difficulty about armed cars of Iraq army or police accompanying tribes to Kuwait. Tribes must leave present location in three days' time at most. I request immediate permission to adopt at discretion

*Not received in Bushire.





- 2 -

discretion either of the two following courses for the period of one month :

- (a) Armoured as well as Iraq Army armed and police cars to accompany tribes to neutral zone and remain there. Air Officer Commanding will, of course, use his discretion as to general reduction of protection and withdrawal of armoured cars if threats of raids disappear;
- (b) Similar forces to accompany tribes to Kuwait.

Second alternative will be adopted by me in preference to the first unless move to Kuwait proves certain to involve considerable casualties to stock.


Not received in Bushire.


Has reference to my telegrams dated 29th January and 12th February, Nos. 47 and 61 respectively.

- HIGH COMMISSIONER.

P.C. sent to Govt. of India under No 52-S. J 23/4/49
Colonial Office
Rusool Bahrain (unnumbered)
P.R., Delhi

Jhs
19/4/49





CONFIDENTIAL

S 1955-2,000-9-14-(E2)

Spl—Resdt P G 118

No. 52-S. of 1929.

Forwarded to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political
Department, for information, in continuation of this office ^{telegram} ~~with reference to~~ _{endorsement} No. 50-S.,
dated the 17th February 1929.

Subject: Akhwan Intelligence. By order,

Lieut.-Colonel,


Bushire:


Secretary
~~Second Assistant~~ to the Political
Resident in the Persian Gulf.

The 23rd February 1929.

List of Papers.

1. Kuwait telegram No. 71, dated 17th February 1929.
2. " " 78, " 20th "
3. Baghdad " 19-S., dated 21st February 1929.





Telegram P.

From Secretary to Political Resident, Bushire.

To Political Agent, Kuwait.

Repeated Political Resident, S/o Foreign and
Political Department, New Delhi.

No. 122.


Dated 23rd February 1929.


IMMEDIATE.

High Commissioner for Iraq has asked the
Colonial Office for permission to move Iraq shepherd
tribes immediately for the period of one month to either
Kuwait territory or neutral zone, owing to lack of
grazing or water in Iraq desert for them. They are now
concentrated 50 miles south-west of Busaiyah. In
either case they will be accompanied by police and
Iraq Army armed cars as well as British armoured cars.
Would the Shaikh of Kuwait object to presence of Iraq
forces.

The above telegram is repeated to Political
Resident for information.

- POLITICAL.





From - The Hon'ble the Political Resident
in the Persian Gulf

To - The Foreign Secretary to the Government of India
in the Foreign and Political Department,
New Delhi.

Memorandum No.53-3

Dated, Bushire the 23rd February 1929.

Supply of ammunition etc. to
the Shaikh of Kuwait.

Reference correspondence ending with memorandum from
the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Depart-
ment No.D.4456-H/28 dated the 31st October 1928.

2. A copy of the marginally noted letter from the political
Letter No.13/10/488 dated 14th February 1929. Agent, Kuwait, communicating the re-
quest of the Shaikh of Kuwait to be

allowed to purchase 50,000 rounds of small ammunition and
certain additional equipment for use with the machine and
Lewis guns supplied to him, is forwarded herewith.

3. It is requested that, if the Government of India see
no objection, sanction may be granted to the issue, on pay-
ment, to the Shaikh of Kuwait of the ammunition and equip-
ment asked for.


4. The stores may be consigned to the Political Agent at
Kuwait via Karachi by the B.I.S.N. Co's slow mail. The
Political Agent will arrange to obtain payment and formal
acknowledge of receipt from the Shaikh.


Lt.-Colonel,

Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

No. 481.

Copy forwarded to the Political Agent, Kuwait.







Telegram Code
From Political Kuwait
To Resident Bushire
Repeated Baghdad and Basrah.
No. 85
Dated 23rd (received 24th) February 1929.


A few families ~~xxx~~ of Kuwait and 'Iraq tribes camping at Umm Ruus were warned by a man of Fywn last night that a small raiding party under Ibn Shuqair, Fuqm and Ibn Lami was about to attack them. He advised them to move at once which they ~~and~~ did and came into Jahrah this morning, Saturday. The Sheikh has sent by car to tribe S.E. of Jahrah. Truth of report not known.


- Political -

P.C. sent to G.G. J. under endst No. 52-S of 23/1/29.
" C.O. " dispatch No. 9 of 26/2/29
" Muscat









Telegram P.

From H.M.'s. Secretary of State for the Colonies, London.

To H.E. the High Commissioner for Iraq, Baghdad, No. 76.

Repeated Political Resident, Bushire, No. 77.

Dated 23rd (received 24th) February 1929.


IMMEDIATE.


The proposals contained in your telegrams Nos. 61 and 78, dated the 12th and 21st February respectively, are approved in so far as they relate to entry into Kuwait provided that His Excellency the Shaikh sees no objection to concentration in Kuwait of armoured cars for the protection of Iraqi tribes for so long a period as one month. His Majesty's Government's approval to these arrangements is given on the understanding :-


- (1) that permission granted is strictly confined to period of present emergency;
- (2) that situation is reviewed by Sir Gilbert Clayton on his arrival in Iraq; and
- (3) that further reference shall be made to His Majesty's Government should circumstances at a later stage require reconsideration of problem or grant of fresh authority on lines now given.


~~XXXXXX~~ His Majesty's Government are unable, in view of military and Political objections to such a course, to agree to forces proposed to accompany tribes into neutral zone since this would involve risk of serious misunderstanding with His Majesty King Bin Saud.


Forces which accompany tribes to Kuwait should be reduced to absolute minimum, and British cars only should






































CONFIDENTIAL.

The British Residency and Consulate-General,
Bushire, the 26th February 1929.

No. 9.

Sir,

In continuation of my despatch No. 8,

-----	dated the 18th
1. Kuwait telegram No. 78, dated	February last, I have
20th February 1929.	the honour to forward
2. " telegram No. 85, dated	for the information
23rd February 1929.	of His Majesty's
3. " telegram No. 90, dated	Government a copy of
24th February 1929.	

the telegrams noted in the margin.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,


Your most obedient,


humble servant,

Lieut.-Colonel,

for Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

HIS MAJESTY'S SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR THE COLONIES,
COLONIAL OFFICE, DOWNING STREET,
L O N D O N.





Telegram P.

From. Political Agent, Bahrain.
To. Political Resident, Bushire
Repeated Sir Fredrick Johnstone- Delhi.
No. 30.
Dated. 26th (Recd 27th) February 1929.

It is reliably reported in Bahrain that Bin Saud was leaving Riyadh on February 24th to camp at Shubaiki north of Riyadh with the object of collecting his forces.

Musaad of Hail, and Jilawi of Hasa who has returned to his capital, have been ordered to collect their tribes.

After Ramazan Bin Saud will march in person. It is stated by some that his objective is Iraq and by others that (it is to ?) punish his own recalcitrant tribes.


There is a rumour that 60,000 men have already collected.


Telegram P

From. Political Resident, Bushire.
To. High Commissioner, Baghdad.
No. 141.
Dated the 27th February 1929.

It is reliably reported x x X
already collected.

Foregoing is from Political Agent, Bahrain
February 26th.





Telegram P.

From. Political Agent, Kuwait.

To. Political Resident, Bushire

(Repeated Highcommissioner, Baghdad).

No. 98.

Dated 26th(Recd 27th) February 1929.


Messengers who were sent by Sheikh of Kuwait to Bin Saud left Riyadh on February 17th and have returned with a letter. In his despatch Sheikh has been informed by King that he is taking field in person and is marching with all his forces on February 25th for Qasin but his objective is not stated.


Ibn Saud had ^{this} ~~this~~ not been disclosed/in Riyadh either ~~either~~ but he openly talked about intrigues of King Feisal, Mesopotamian forts etc., as if to imply Mesopotamia was going to be attacked by him.

There was little doubt however that his real intention is to try to subdue Ibn Humaid. The latter was then in camp between Buraidah and Zilfi with eleven standards and it was believed that his intention was to raid Salman by way of Linah.

_____ who it was thought was at Ajjibah was to go with him. Ibn Saud's servants informed them that Ibn Jiluwi was under orders to march on Safah.

Dawish was at Artawiyah when they left but news has just been received here from another source that Dawish moved out on February 21st to Umm al Jamajim.





Telegram Code
From Political Kuwait
To Resident Bushire
Repeated Baghdad and Basrah.
Mp.99
Dated 26th (received 27th) February 1929.

My No.85.


A man of Rashaidah has just come who was told by a member of the raiding party that it did actually start but on learning the tribe they had inteded ~~xxxx~~ raiding had concentrated round Jahrah they decided to abandon project. All accordingly went back excepting a small party of Jiblan who said that they would try and raid some Awazex in Neutral Zone ~~xxxx~~ between Kuwait and Nejd. It is not known yet whether they did so or not.


- POLITICAL -


...


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Jc 27/2


W
2.3.29



























Telegram Code
From Political Kuwait
To Resident Bushire
Repeated Baghdad and Basra
No. 108
Dated 28th February (received 1st March) 1929.



My No. 99.


Rumour has been received here that a party of Buraih (not Jiblan) raided some Ajman in Shaqqy a day or two ago thinking they were Awazim. On discovering their mistake they restored the plunder.


- Political -

W
5.3.29









Telegram P.

From. Political Agent, Bahrain.
To. Political Resident, New Delhi.
Repeated Bushire.

No. 31.
Dated 1st (recd&nd) March 1929.

Dawish has gone to ? Humaidan.


It is reported that Bin Saud has ordered
Bin Rubain of Utaibah to encamp at Kasim to await
orders.


Telegram P.


From. Political Resident, Bushire.
To. High Commissioner, Baghdad.
No 148.
Dated the 2nd March 1929.

Dawish X X orders.

Foregoing is from Bahrain March 1st.









6/14 99 (120)

A
1a

Reference to previous correspondence:—

Secretary of State's *Secret*
High Commissioner's Despatch No. 47
27th August, 1928.

Persian Gulf.
Secret.

BUSHIRE RESIDENCY.
Reg. No. 191
Date: 2/3/29
MARITIME RECORDS.

Downing Street,
2 - FEB 1929

Sir,

I have the honour to transmit to you

for your information copies of

the papers noted below on the subject of the mission of

Sir Gilbert Clayton to the King of the Hejaz.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,



Your most obedient, humble servant,


Is Amery


Honble.
The High Commissioner
The Political Resident
in the Persian Gulf.


Date.	Description.
1928.	
July-August.	Report on the resumption of the mission. (4 copies)
	Copy sent to Muscat, Bahrain, Kuwait } vide our 565.7 2-3-29
	<i>JS</i> 2/3


(R1) W120109/1756 5,000 1/27 H & SF Sp 112













61/24 383 4/3/1929. 100
(123)

Telegram Code
From High Commissioner for 'Iraq, Baghdad
To Political Kuwait
Repeated Bushire
No.90
Dated and received 3rd March 1929.

IMPORTANT. A.O.C. wishes to send Special Service Officer to Kuwait temporarily as was done all last year. Has Sheikh any objection ?

- HIGHCOMA -

393
4/3/29


Telegram Code
From Political Kuwait
To Resident Bushire
Repeated Baghdad
No.120
Dated and Received the 4th March 1929.

Your No.90. The Sheikh has no objection at all to a Special Service Officer being sent here temporarily but on the contrary welcomes idea, as also do I.

- POLITICAL -

W 5/5 29

Replied to P.H. Newbell under Nos 157 & 158 10/5/29.
L. 5/5





6/14 380
3/3/29 101
(126)

Telegram Code
From Political Kuwait
To High Commissioner for Iraq, Baghdad
Repeated Administrative Inspector and Special Service Officer, Basra and Bushire.
No. 114
Dated and received the 3rd March 1929.


My No. 112.
The 50 tents of Bani Malik are now being attacked by raiders under Ibn Shuqair, Fuqm and Ibn Lami at Jalib Ash Shuyukh a short distance outside wall of Kuwait. If aeroplanes could come now they might catch them.


- Political -

W
3.2.26.

Repealed to Foreign New Delhi for P.R. under No. 158 27/4/29.
4/5/29.

Note
Bani Malik is a big order. This is name of one of the 3 large confederations forming the "Mamluk". Other two being Bani Said & Ajwad. Bani Malik themselves consist of some 30 large tribes. Probably Sub-tribe attached is the "Albu Saleh" normally resident North of Hawas Lake in Iraq. W
5.3.29.





Telegram Code
From Political Kuwait
To Resident Bushire
Repeated Baghdad and Basra.
No. 115.


Dated 3rd (received 4th) March 1929.


My No. 112


The firing audible now 0830 hour but no further details received. Sheikh has patrol car out to keep raiders under observation but fore is too big for him to attack. Kuwait tribes who were further away believed ~~there~~ all concentrated Jaryah.


- POLITICAL -


W
5.3.














Telegram P.

From. High Commissioner, Baghdad.
To. Secretary of State for Colonies ,No 92.
Repeated Bushire,Kuwait and Jeddah,No 23-S.
Dated 3rd (Recd 4th) March 1929.


This morning four to five hundred Akhwan raiders attacked Iraq sheperd tribe near Kuwait. Raiders were followed up by aeroplane which came in contact with them about 20 miles south of Kuwait. Raiders opened ^{heavy} fire killing one wireless operator; they were bombed and machine gunned with good result. Within the last 6 weeks this has been the fourth raid on Ifaq tribes as it now appears that there was a raid on February 19th on Iraq Shammur at Gaisuma in Nejd as well as raid at Lauqa reported in my telegram of 25th February No 87, repeated to Bushire and Jeddah No 22-S.


According to information sent by Bin Saud in his letter to Sheikh of Kuwait, former was to leave Riyadh on February 25th for Qasim with all his forces. Bin Saud did not state the object of his movement but his most likely object seems to ^{be to} secure control of tribes. It therefore seems most desirable that a strong protest should be made to him at once against these repeated attacks on Mesopotamian tribes.


Telegram P.

From. Political,Bushire.
To. Foreign and Political Dt.,New Delhi.
No 154.
Dated the 4th March 1929.

This X X tribes.
Foregoing is for Political Resident from High Commissioner,Baghdad to Secretary of State for Colonies 92 repeated Bushire,Kuwait and Jeddah 23-S.














"رسم تخطيطي مبدئي تقريبي يبين هجرة القبائل التي ترعى الأغنام والحمير والجمال بالفرات الأدنى خلال الخريف والشتاء والربيع" [٣٠١ ظ] (٢/٢)









(2)-

thousand camels.


3. The Muntafik settled tribes being agriculturists sow practically their whole country with wheat and barley every year after the first autumn rains.

This necessitates a general exodus of their nomadic elements for economic reasons.

At the same time as the Autumn rains turn the great "Shamiyeh" desert with the most wonderful grazing ground that could be found in the world, the exodus is welcomed to a degree scarcely understood by a person who has not lived among these tribes. Approximately this grazing area, where the grass grows wadst-high, extends the whole length of the Euphrates and for a distance of roughly 100 miles to the south till one comes to the rolling sand (Nafud). Roughly speaking the 'Iraq-Nejd boundary passes down the centre of this area, and all nomadic tribes whether of Nejd, 'Iraq or Kuwait make for it with all speed as soon as the first rain falls.

4. One of the reasons for the hostility which both the 'Iraq Nomads and Nejd tribes have for the artificial boundary as made by us, is now apparent. In the olden days (Turkish times) all tribes whether from the North or the South met in this area in perfectly peaceful manner, and by mutual understanding and interchange of presents put all feuds that may have existed, aside for a while. Those who did not wish to make a truce, understood the risk and made arrangements accordingly.

5. It must here be realised that the 3 great Nejd tribes Shammar, Mutaair and Ajman, also took advantage of this grazing season, to do their marketing along the Euphrates. Some bought dates and rice and their requirements generally, from the shepherd tribes who anticipating their wants brought large supplies out with them, others actually went right up to the Euphrates and made their purchases there. The Nejd tribes' chief articles for sale in return were rifles camels and camels' wool.





- (3) -

The boundary question and the difficulties arising from the personal relations of Bin Saud and Faisal, has upset the old arrangement badly. Both Nejd and 'Iraq have forbidden each others Nomads to cross the artificial boundary and so an atmosphere of hatred and suspicion is the order of the day.


Without doubt the British Government has given orders that any 'Iraq tribe found across the boundary in his territory is now fair game, and vice versa. This is the pity of the whole thing. Left alone the Bedouin and shepherd could be counted on to settle their differences and arrange a modus vivendi, whilst living in the grazing area. With Governments mixing themselves up in the game chaos has resulted.

7. As regards the grazing itself. This normally exists from December right on to February. As it gets a bit scarcer, the 'Iraq tribes 1, 2, 3 of the sketch, gradually move down towards Kuwait, their object is primarily to follow the grass, but in secondary degree to get near the Kuwait Market where they annually dispose of their wool, and Ghi. Both these commodities are baled and tinned in the desert by the women of the tribes, and fetch far better prices in Kuwait than in their own homes. Having effected their sales all return ~~slowly~~ slowly by the direct route back towards their homes via the Hamar lake.

The end of the trek or migration depends accordingly as the rains are good or bad. The tribes generally arrive on the Euphrates at the end of March or early in April and are back in their homes by harvest time.

8. With the return of the tribes to their respective homes peace can be counted to reign in the desert once more, for there is no longer anyone there to create trouble, or tempt the raider pure and simple.

9. Finally once back in their tribal areas (I exclude the "Dhafir" camel tribe which remains on the south bank of the





(4)-

134
106-2


the Euphrates till mid summer and then crosses to the Shatt el Kar) the sheep and donkeys continue their grazing on the stubble of the reaped corn fields until such time as it is time to go out again in the autumn.


10. The above cycle takes place year after year, and has done for the last 1000 years I suppose. If the shepherds don't go out into the Shaslyeh their sheep will die. Nothing must stop them.


11. The putting of the 'Iraq tribes under the protection of aeroplanes and armoured cars has in my opinion spoilt everything; and I have it on excellent authority that the shepherd tribes themselves, dislike the innovation more than anyone else. Their hands are tied, they are moved about at the will of a British Officer, and are no longer free to send their time honoured embassies to the other side, asking for peace (aman) whilst on the "common grazing ground of Ued" (as they call it).


Last but not least they feel, and in fact they are now looked upon as fair game to anyone who is out to annoy the 'Iraq Government, as both Bin Saud and his big northern tribesmen undoubtedly are.


12. One last word on Kuwait. What is the Shaikh's position? He cannot but understand the situation perfectly. He must welcome the 'Iraq tribes for trade reasons each year yet he knows they are liable to attack by the Nejd tribes once they are in his territory for he is powerless to prevent it. To avoid this he tries to keep in with Bin Saud or his big tribal leaders. He also must be on good terms with 'Iraq. He flirts with both as a result, and lays himself open to the charge of double dealing, mostly by 'Iraqis. The Shaikh undoubtedly has a personal liking for Bin Saud, his whole history shows this, but certain elements in his town are violently hostile to the ruler of Nejd, notably the richest man in Kuwait one "Hilal al Mutairi" who owns vast lands roundabout Basra and ^{is} one of the biggest pearl merchants in


























Telegram Code
From Political Kuwait
To Resident Bushire
Repeated Baghdad and Basra.
No. 135
Dated 7th (received 8th) March 1929.

My No. 96.


A messenger who left Riyadh on 27th February reports that Ibn Saud was still there then but was leaving for Buraidah by car himself 2nd March, and his force under his son Sa'ud was marching soon after that date.


He heard Ibn Humaid (had) gone raiding but not Dawish who was believed to be at Artawiyah.


- POLITICAL -


Post copy to G. F. J.
Colonial Office
Muscat


ms
9/3



















61/14 114 (13)

No. 125-S. Political Agency, Kuwait.
5th March 1929.

BUSHIRE RESIDENCY.
Res. No. 219
Date 12/3/29
CONFIDENTIAL RECORDS.

From Lieutenant-Colonel J. C. More, D.S.O.,
Political Agent, Kuwait.

To The Administrative Inspector,
Basrah Liwa, Basrah.
The Kuwait - Zubair Road.

Sir,



With reference to the correspondence ending with your telegram No. 209 dated the 25th February 1929 on the subject of the Kuwait - Zubair Road, I have the honour to inform you that His Excellency the Shaikh of Kuwait has given an undertaking in writing that he will not hold the Mutasarrif of Basrah in any way responsible for the lives or property of Kuwait subjects using the road, even on that portion of it which lies in 'Iraq territory, if at his request they be allowed to use it before the Mutasarrif is prepared to accept the responsibility of declaring the road open for general use, always provided that the road be closed again if and when the Shaikh conveys the request that this may be done. At the present moment, however, he does not wish his subjects to be allowed to use it.


2. If and when the Shaikh does again wish the road to be opened for Kuwait subjects as above, he will not accept responsibility for the safety of other nationalities using the Kuwait portion of it, at any rate until the Mutasarrif of Basrah is again prepared to accept responsibility for the safety of Kuwait subjects using the 'Iraq portion.



3. The Shaikh will not necessarily accept responsibility for the safety of the mail in Kuwait territory whenever it is allowed to leave, even though he may request



61/14 114 (13)



Not recd. Bushire





















Telegram Code

From Political Kuwait

To Repeated Resident Bushire
Baghdad and Basra

No. 156

Dated despatched 13th
received. 14th March 1929.



A man of Awazim who has just arrived from the South reports that advance party and baggage for Ibn Jiluwi's force arrived at NTA 10th March and are awaiting him there. Awazim had had orders to move out 13th March to meet Ibn Jiluwi who was to march from Basa with a large force on 13th March. It was said that Abdullah bin Jiluwi was on the way coming in person but this is considered improbable here.



- POLITICAL -



PR. 14/3


Post copies sent to Govt. of India, No. 8/5 for Colonies No. P.A. Muscat

14/3









Telegram P.

From. Political Resident, Bushire.

To. Political Agent, Kuwait.

No. 177.


Dated the 14th March 1929.


Immediate

Telegram dated the 13th January No 29-S from High Commissioner is of nature he should not have addressed to you.

Your reply should be sent to me only. Glubbs' telegram has not been seen by me but I await your report.

By all means discuss matter in reasonable spirit with Sheikh but at this stage there seems no reason for threats.





Telegram P.

From. Political Agent, Kuwait.

To. High Commissioner, Baghdad, repeated
Political Resident, Bushire.

No. 160.


Dated and Recd. 14th March 1929.



That Sheikh certainly is trying to avoid involving his own people in quarrel with Mutair by allowing them to purchase supplies here etc., is, I think, true. He may even have been influenced by this desire in deciding that raiders were too strong to take opposition actively when I suggested on March 3rd that he should send out cars after them as he had done last year.


It would of course be a very different matter if he allowed URAEDAR to join MUTAIR in a raid on a Mesopotamian tribe or to keep plunder taken in such a raid. Such a thing could not be tolerated if true. But presumably I do not believe accusation.


I have very high opinion of Glubb's ability but he is not infallible. When one considers how suspicious Mesopotamian shepherd tribes must be at present of any one of NEJD type to which URAEDAR belongs it would be strange if there were no rumours of this sort about. Moreover there are of course people in Mesopotamia who would like to see Kuwait made part of that country, and it is not inconceivable that such persons might encourage any such anti-Kuwait rumours as propaganda.

URAEDARS are not paragons and I know that like all bedouin a raid might appeal to some of them, but they could hardly have expected to participate in a raid so close to the town









Telegram P.

From. Political Agent, Kuwait.
To. Political Resident, Bushire.
No. Nil. (1617)
Dated and Recd. 14th March 1929.

Following is a repetition of Glubb's message referred to in Baghdad telegram 29-S.
Begins Present position impossible. ARAIBDAR are camped with MUTAIR from South KHAHAJ AL ARFI to UMM RUUS. Remainder of MUTAIR SUBAIHIYAH SHAQQ east end MUSANNAT.

ARAIBDAR openly admit alliance with horse
MUTAIR and they camp with fully armed MUTAIR/and
camelmen.

Reliable report MUTAIR were assisted by ARAIBDAR on raid on BANI MALIK and that ARAIBDAR had three horses killed. Large amount BANI MALIK loot now with ARAIBDAR on the spot. As long as enemy raiders can live undisturbed with ARAIBDAR twenty miles from here awaiting good opportunity patrols and reconnaissance are useless Ends.


Presumably no further action possible if no plunder found, but if any ~~any~~ am I to threaten Sheikh as High Commissioner wishes ?.


Above refers to my immediately preceding telegram.


Pat copy sent to G. of J. vide N.
Colonial office " N.
Muscat -


dahl

J.S.
14/3











Telegram P.


From. Political Agent, Kuwait,
To. Political Resident, Bushire.
No. 163.
Dated and Recd. 15th March 1929.


I saw Glubb for a few minutes today March 14th. He came in to escort sheep saved from recent raid. His telegram of March 10th gives exaggerated idea of what he really means. He thinks URAIBDAR have kept without Sheikh's knowledge some of scattered animals which they collected, but not that this was due in the wholesale manner one would understand from his telegram which would have pre-supposed connivance of Sheikh.


Above refers to my telegram 161.




















Telegram P.

From. Political Agent, Kuwait.
To. Political Resident, Bushire.
No. 167.
Dated 15th (recd 16th) March 1929.

Aeroplanes have two or three times landed at Kuwait since Special Service Officer has been here and have brought him field wireless set, stores for it etc., I see no objection to this/whatever but as a matter of courtesy I would like to be able to tell Sheikh beforehand.

I have just heard that one has arrived(?) but that gives me no time .

Could you request that reasonable previous warning when possible may be given me.


Telegram P.


From. Political Resident, Bushire.
To. Political Agent, Kuwait.
No. 184
Dated the 16th March 1929.


Cannot you arrange with Special Service Officer to get news of aeroplanes beforehand.


If not Aviation Baghdad may be asked direct to give you information.


Foregoing refers to your 167.







































Telegram P.

From. Political Agent, Bahrein.
To. Political Resident, Bushire.
No. 43.
Dated 20th (recd 21st) March 1929.


It is reported that sub-division of Harb were attacked by Humaid. Customs at Ujair which was issuing passports has been ordered to discontinue practice, return passport forms to Ibn Jilawi and refer applicants to Hasa. Object is to prevent Nejd subjects who were being conscripted from leaving the country.



Hasa contingent will be led by Fahad Jilawi- Its estimated strength is 2000 men; Army collected in Qasim will be commanded by Saud ibn Abdulaziz. Ibn Saud himself will not leave Nejd until his son marches for destination which is still unknown. There is an unconfirmed rumour that Ibn Humaid has been defeated and slain and that guns in honour of the victory were fired at Qatif.


Above repeated to High Commissioner, Baghdad and Political Agent, Kuwait under No. 197, dated the 21st March 1929.

Post copy sent to G. J. under No. 85-5, 23-3-29
Colonies
Muscat

ms.
24/3









87/14
CONFIDENTIAL L. 138 (63)

No. 179-S.

BUSHIRE RESIDENCY Political Agency, Kuwait.
Reg. No. 249
Date 24.3.29
CONFIDENTIAL RECORDS.

18th March 1929.

To
The Secretary to the Hon'ble the Political Resident
in the Persian Gulf,
B U S H I R E.

Special Service Office.

MEMORANDUM.


Reference my telegram No. 134 dated the 6th March 1929.


Flight Lieutenant E. J. Howes, R.A.F., arrived here as Special Service Officer on the afternoon of the 6th March, and appears to be an extremely good type of officer, with plenty of tact, and he will, I am sure, give me no trouble by interfering in political matters.

He has since received a field wireless set with two operators, which he uses to the exclusion of the telegraph.

HK/122 of 8-3-29	He gives me two copies of all messages
HK/124 of 9-3-29	which he sends, but, in the interests
HK/19 of 11-3-29	of economy I am not repeating these to
HK/21 of 11-3-29	you unless they contain information of
HK/25 of 12-3-29	exceptional interest. I enclose here-
HK/26 of 12-3-29	with for your information copies of
HK/27 of 13-3-29	the more interesting reports and mes-
HK/32 of 13-3-29	sages which he has sent.
HK/39 of 14-3-29	
HK/56 of 16-3-29	
HK/58 of 16-3-29	
HK/60 of 17-3-29	
HK/64 of 18-3-29	

J. C. Howes
Lieut.-Col.,
Political Agent, Kuwait.





Reference
No. HK/1/2

Kuwait,
8th March 1929.

SECRET.

Air Staff Intelligence
Air Headquarters,
Hinaidi.

A caravan from part of the Said (Dhafir) who are camped with Ibn Ashwan (Brah-Mutair) some 5 miles SE of Dhanaib ad Dhib (in the Batin) arrived at Kuwait this afternoon, having left their camp on the 2nd instant.


They state that Hizab aba Dhra' (Dhar'an- Dhafir) also camped with Ibn Ashwan, returned about the 1st inst from a visit to Ibn Saud at Riyadh. He stated that he personally had seen many war banners collected on the outskirts of the town and a large force in process of collection.


Ibn Saud, he said, had left Riyadh about the 18th February by car for the Qasim and the force was to follow him. The popular opinion in Riyadh was that Ibn Saud intended to attack Ibn Humaid. He had with him in Riyadh before he left, Muhsin al Firm (Harb) Al Haidhal (Ataibah) Al Hamaidani (Mutair) and - though informants were not sure - Ibn Rubai'an (Ataibah) and Ibn Busaiyis (Mutair).

Hizab and his following were given a cold reception - presumably because they are camping with Mutair - and were dismissed with a present of Rs 20 each

The informants confirm previous information that Azaiyiz son of the Duwish reached the Neutral Area with a party of raiders, said to be 400 strong. His scouts are reported to have sighted the camp fires of the Zayyad at Samah and the raid on arrival there found traces of a hasty flight by the shepherds, and fresh car tracks. They are understood to have commenced their return journey from this point and to have been met at Dulaimiyah by a messenger from the Duwish recalling his son, with the intention, it is believed of rallying in support of Ibn Humaid. Informants stated that Azaiyiz, having broken his oath of allegiance and obedience to Ibn Saud, could expect no clemency from the Sultan and the Mutair therefore have no option but to join with Ibn Humaid.

It is said that Ibn Duwaihi (Suwait- Dhafir) was invited by this party to join them in the raid and did so though involuntarily, through fear of reprisals. Informants, however, were not agreed on this statement.





(2)

As a result of the air attack on Ibn Shuqair's raid, Ibn Jarbu', who was camped near Umm al Amarah Ash Shaqq, withdrew in a South-Easterly direction to a point between al Riqai and the Musannat ridge


The Mutair are said to have been observing very carefully the movements of car patrols and now say that as the cars withdraw at noon, intending raiders should arrange their march so as to be well inside Mutair territory before noon and, by riding hard and fast afterwards, to surprise the grazing tribes at dawn the following morning.


From another source comes the report that Ibn Jilluwi, acting on instructions from Ibn Saud, is raising a large tribal force in the Hasa to be commanded by one of his sons and has announced as a meeting place As Safa. The date of concentration was not known to informant but it is hoped to obtain further information relative to this, during the next three days.

W. H. Jones

Flight Lieut.,
Special Service Officer.
Kuwait.

Copy to Political Agent, Kuwait.





Reference
HK/1/4

Kuwait,
9th March, 1929

SECRET

Air Staff Intelligence
Air Headquarters
Baghdad.

1. The following rumours are current in the town, though no confirmation has as yet been obtained.


- (a) The Duwish is said to have instructed Ibn Shuqair, al Fughm and Ibn Lami to join Ibn Hathlain in ~~the~~ a raid on the Awazim camped near Subaihiyah. The Awazim are reported to have refused to join Ibn Hathlain in his raid of January 21st and the proposed attack on them is therefore in the nature of revenge.
- (b) Ibn Humaid recently attacked shepherds from Buraidah in the vicinity of the town and looted their flocks. The date of the occurrence is not yet known.
- (c) The inhabitants of Amaizah refused to join Ibn Saud in any attack on Ibn Humaid or the Duwish who, they said, were Muslimin like themselves. They were prepared to defend their town and to prevent the entry of the Akhwan therein.
- (d) Bandar ibn Ashwan, a younger brother of Ali ibn Ashwan, is reported to have set out with a following of four or five to visit Ibn Saud. It is said that Ali recently had a disagreement with another Mutair leader and that the object of Bandar's visit is to make submission on behalf of the family to the King.


Comment.


Paragraphs (a) and (c) are considered improbable. Ibn Hathlain has a long standing "bon voisinage" treaty with the Awazim and reliable opinions agree that he is unlikely to raid them.


Para (c) may have been circulated by the Akhwan.

2. Nahar as Shuraiti (Shammar - Aslam) who earlier in the year was camped with the Dhafir and later joined the Fedawiyah, set out on the 7th instant to camp with the Mutair at the invitation of Ibn Lami who promised him protection. It is reported that he was attacked yesterday the 8th instant, by Al Mutrugga in Ash Shaqq, most of his camels being looted and one man killed. Some of the Wajaan (Shammar-Aslam) also camped with the Fedawiyah went out to collect the women.











Telegram Enclaire
From Howes Kuwait
To Aviation
Repeated Glubb, Special Basra and Burton.
No.H.K./19
Dated 11th March 1929.


Reference para two my letter HK/1/4 of 9/3
forwarded by aircraft today. Confirmed Mohammed Shuraiti
(not Mahar) with four or five tents when on his way join
Ibn Lami (Jiulan - Mutair) was raided in Ash Shaqq on 8/3
by Aiyid al Mutrugga (Brain-Mutair). Lost about fifty camels.
he was camped with Bedawiyah before move.


Telegram Enclaire
From Howes Kuwait
To Aviation Baghdad
Repeated Glubb, Special Basrah and Burton.
No.HK/21
Dated the 11th March.



Shammar (Abdan) caravan from Habbas ibn Habbas
camped with Ibn Ashwan (Brain-Mutair) confirms information
paras 2 and 3 of my letter HK/1/2 of 8/3 forwarded you by
today's aircraft. Unconfirmed rumour that villages of Sudair
district Najd refused join forces of Ibn Saud and paid money
in lieu. Rumour possibly has Akhwan origin.






















Telegram Enclaire
From Howes Kuwait
To Aviation
Repeated Glubb, Special Basra and Burton.
No.HK/32
Dated the 13th March 1929.



Agent brings report considered reliable
that all Mutair in vicinity Musannat withdrew about
9th March. States Duwish ordered retirement to Jarrab
where he is now camped but as it is probable Mutair would
move back considerable distance after recent affray with
cars reason given for withdrawal is doubtful. Mutairi
who brought this news said he left Ibn Hathlain the day
latter withdraw southwards to join Duwish. Report
differs slightly from my HK/27 of today though Ibn
Hathlain may have camped Shaib Shaiyit on way to Jarrab.




































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SGPS., 621...1081...5,000...18 9 2a.

٦١/١٤

(١٨١)
١٥٢

H. C. F. 16.

SECRETARIAT OF H. E. THE HIGH
COMMISSIONER FOR 'IRAQ.

No. S.O. 626

EL PRESIDENCY.

Reg. No. 251

Date 20.3.29

CONFIDENTIAL RECORDS.

Baghdad, 15 March, 1929.

By direction of His Excellency the High Commissioner for 'Iraq, a copy of correspondence as marked below is forwarded with compliments to :—

The Secretary to the
Hon'ble the Political Resident
in the Persian Gulf, Bushire.

H.B.M's Agent and Consul,
Jiddah.

707 21/3
Mar 21/7


Political Secretary


to H. E. The High Commissioner for 'Iraq.

Enclosures :—

Letter No. S.O. 624 dated 15-3-29, to H.B.M's Political Agent, Kuwait, with its enclosures.

T.C.





No. S.O. 624 Secretariat of H.E. the High
Commissioner for 'Iraq,
Baghdad, 15 March, 1929.

Sir,

I am directed to request you to forward
the enclosed letters to King 'Abdul Aziz al Sa'ud
by the quickest means available.

Copies of these letters are enclosed for
your information.

I am sending copies of this letter and
enclosures to the Secretary of State for the
Colonies, the Resident in the Persian Gulf, and
His Majesty's Agent and Consul, Jiddah.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your most obedient servant,


(Sd.) R S M. Sturges


Political Secretary to
H.E. the High Commissioner for 'Iraq.


H.B.M.'s Political Agent,


KUWAIT.

T.C.









رقم اس ١٥٠
دار الاعتصام
بغداد في ١٤ آذار سنة ١٩٢٩

No. S.O. ١٥٠ The Residency,
Baghdad, 14th March, 1929.

يا صاحب الجلالة

Your Majesty,

After greetings,

يؤسفني جدا ان يكون
الداعي الى اول رسالة رسمية
مني الى جلالكم ضرورة اخلاصكم
على حدوث سلسلة من الممارات
على الرعاة او المسافرين العراقيين
وهم ينتجعون الكلاء ضمن في
جوار الحدود او في اراضي
شيخ الكويت

I deeply regret that my first
official communication to Your Majesty
should be occasioned by the necessity
of reporting the occurrence of a series
of raids on 'Iraqi shepherds or tribesmen
while peacefully grazing, in the neighbour-
hood of the frontier or in the territories
of the Sheikh of Kuwait.


٢. وقد تكبد رعايا العراق
من جراء هذه الممارات خسائر
خفيفة في النفوس والاموال وان
جلالكم لا شك قد بلغكم انه
الهجوم الذي وقع في ٢١ كانون
الثاني قد سبب قتل سائح اميري
مري كل المارة


2. These raids resulted in serious
loss of life and property to 'Iraqi
subjects and Your Majesty has doubtless
heard that the attack which took place
on the 21st January occasioned the
murder of a perfectly innocent American
traveller.


٣. اقدم في هذه مذكرة
اثبت فيها ما تم وروده من
التفصيل ومنها ستلاحظ جلال
ان الاحوال مما تدعو بحق الى
الاضطراب وثوران الحواشي في هذه البلاد
٤. وقد كانت الحالة من
الخطورة بحيث استوجبت العمل
من قبل قوات صاحب الجلالة البريطانية
دفاع


3. I attach a note giving such
details as have come to hand from which
Your Majesty will observe that conditions
are such as to cause justifiable alarm
and indignation in this country.

4. The situation was so serious as
to necessitate action by His Britannic
Majesty's Forces in defence of the
victims












مذكرة من طرقات الاخوان *


Note on recent Akiwan Raids.


١. At dawn on January 21st, 'Iraq shepherd tribes who were grazing their sheep in northern Kuwait were attacked in Kuwait territory some 35 miles south of Zubair by an Akiwan raiding party of between 200 and 300 armed men; the majority mounted on camels, the remainder on horses. The 'Iraq tribesmen were taken by surprise in their tents and 17 of them at least were killed and their animals were looted. The latter are conservatively estimated at 4,500 sheep and 500 donkeys. The 'Iraq tribes raided were the Zoba, Bani Malik, Buzal section of the Ghazzi, Najid sect. of the Jumaian and the Jawarin. The raiders consisted mainly of Ajman trib but included a number of Mutair tribesmen also. A man who was captured by the raiders and detained for two days reports that they were led by Dhaidan ibn Hithlain (Ajman) and Shuraiyan ibn Lami (Jiblan section of the Mutair). On the afternoon of the same day the same raiding party fired on two cars on the Basrah - Zubair road a few miles south of the scene of the raid. The first car travelling from Basrah contained Mr. Charles Crane and Mr. Bilkert, an American Missionary, the latter being killed. The second car travelling from Kuwait contained Colonel Watson who escaped unhurt.
٢. On February 19th 21 tribes of the 'Iraq Zaiyed

























61 526
14 23/3/29

(191)
162

Telegram Code
From Political Kuwait
To Resident Bushire
No. 205
Dated 22nd (received 23rd) March 1929.

Unconfirmed rumour reached here that
FIRM. Ibn Rubaian and Firm have seized and surrendered to some
of "Funachif" (ex-raiders) plunder from Ibn Humaid Shammar's
raid and also that Dawish has sent Ibn Saud conciliatory
message(s).

Addressed Resident repeated as my 196.


- POLITICAL -


PR. ***** 23/3

23/3

Post copy sent to G. J. J. under No 85-5, dy 23.3.29.
Colombo .. dy
G Muscat-

23





Telegram P.


From. Political Agent, Kuwait.
To. Political Resident, Bushire.
No. 207.
Dated 22nd (recd 23rd) March 1929.


February 24th was date on which I asked for Sheikh's of Kuwait's concurrence for a period of one month. I believe that owing to drought elsewhere it is still desired to keep Iraq tribes in Kuwait territory for a considerable time. Should I ask him to agree for a further period.? I have no doubt that he will agree, notwithstanding fact that he must be tired of always having these tribes so close to Bahrah, as I most certainly am. Both sides regard it as a grand opportunity to bring most frivolous complaints to the Sheikh ~~xxxxxx~~ about Iraq tribes and to Glubb about Kuwait people, which must mean a great deal of extra work to the former.


Reference is to my telegram No 96.


Post copy sent to G. of India under N^o 85-5.723-3-29.
Colms .. N^o 4
Muscat.

[Signature]
23/3









Telegram P

From. Political Resident, Bushire.

To. High Commissioner, Baghdad.

No. 205.

Dated the 23rd March 1929.


February 24th was date on which Sheikh of Kuwait concurred in concentration for period of one month. Should he be asked to extend period ?


Foregoing refers to Colonial Office telegram No 76 of February 23rd.


J.B.


Post copy sent to G. J. I. under No. B-S. 7 dy 25.3.29
S/S. Colonis... 11- dy
Murrah.


J.B.
25.3





















Telegram P.

From. Political Agent, Kuwait.
To. Political Resident, Bushire.
No. 210.
Dated 24th (recd 25th) March 1929.

Although up to now policy of Sheikh of Kuwait in keeping out of quarrel as long as possible is somewhat annoying to Mesopotamia it may and probably has been best on the whole - at any rate in the interests of his own subjects. If on the other hand Bin Saud attacks and defeats his recalcitrant tribes and the latter fled to Kuwait territory I consider that it would be extremely foolish if the Sheikh even thought of granting them an asylum, and it would not be wise on our part to allow him. Were he to help them he would become Ibn Saud's enemy for life, and we know from Salim's reign how troublesome (he had^{been}/?). Moreover not only from Mesopotamia, point of view but also vis a vis Bin Saud there presence in Kuwait would be annoying to us.

As a matter of fact the people themselves, I think, would object to their being allowed to take refuge in town itself and Sheikh has not at his disposal sufficient forces to keep them out of the rest of his territory unaided unless they be absolutely demoralized and broken. He could, however, deny supplies and if and when this ~~contingency~~ contingency arises I think he should be advised to do so, even if this entails sending ships etc., to protect him.

Foregoing is with reference to Para 6 of Baghdad's telegram No 114.





543-
25/3

61/14 (191)
170

Telegram	Code
From	Political Kuwait
To	Resident Bushire
Repeated	High Commissioner and Aviation Baghdad Administrative Inspector and Special Basrah Glubb and copy to Howes.

No.212

Dated and received the 25th March 1929.


Man who left Jau Manakh in summon on 18th March reports that message transmitted to Dawish had just arrived there with orders for all Mutair in the neighbourhood to join Dawish forthwith. These orders had been issued with the intention of attacking Firm at Ajibbah, but just as messenger was about to leave Dawish's camp letter arrived from Ibn Humaid urging Dawish to come to his aid at Jalah at once as Ibn Saud had moved out of Buraidah and was advancing towards him with a very large force. Ibn Saud was still talking about peaceful settlement in accordance with religious law but Ibn Humaid did not believe his peaceful intention and considered flight inevitable. Man who brought news still in Uraibdar camp but has been sent for.


- POLITICAL -


PR. 25/3


Post copy sent to G.G.S. under No. 4
Colonial office. N.
Muscant & Col.
Barrett (at Bushire)

25/3









-2-

comments on the situation which the Resident may
desire to make would be welcomed.

3. A copy of this despatch is also being sent
to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.

I have the honour to be,


Sir,


Your most obedient servant,

Robert Lingen

Political Secretary to
H.E. the High Commissioner for 'Iraq.

M. I.
21.





SECRET.

No. 754.

Office of the Administrative Inspector, (202)

In-charge Southern Desert.

Adhaira, dated the 12th March, 1929.
15th

To:-


The Adviser,
Ministry of Interior,
Baghdad.

Subject. RELATION WITH KUWAIT.

As is well known, the principality of Kuwait was until a few years ago, one of the chief powers in Arabia, and dealt on an equal footing with Ibn Sa'ud, Ibn Rashid and the Sharif. Though his territory was not so very extensive nor his tribes so numerous as those of his allies or rivals, his financial resources, chiefly derived from pearling, were considerable. Moreover the Kuwait deserts, though not comparatively very extensive, supply most excellent grazing, and the Ajman, Mutair, Rashaidah, Awazim and other large tribes have frequently in the past placed themselves under the protection of the Shaikh.

The present Shaikh from the time of his accession, however, has shown himself completely incapable of dealing with the crisis with which the Akhwan menace have threatened his town. Almost all the tribes which owed allegiance to Kuwait when Ahmad ibn Subah succeeded, have gone over to the Akhwan. Many of them, such as the Awazim, continue to live in Kuwait territory, but own allegiance to Ibn Jiluwi, the Governor of Hasa, who taxes them and orders them about within the boundaries of Kuwait. The miserable remnants of the Kuwait tribes have, for the last two or three years, spent most of their time covering beneath the walls of the town. Although Ibn Subah is generally reputed to have plenty of money, he does not seem to relish spending it on defending his country.

This year, however, the situation has taken on an
entirely





- 2 -

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
entirely new aspect. For the past 18 months, ever since the Duwish has been virtually in revolt against Ibn Sa'ud, he has endeavoured to secure an ally in Ibn Subah. All bedouins have to purchase their necessities in some coast or river town, a bedouin banned by the authorities of all the towns, can be brought to book without fighting. Mutair, threatened by a blockade on one side in Najd, and on the other in 'Iraq, were until recently in a very awkward position. Last autumn, however the Duwish and Ibn Subah made a private agreement, according to which the latter would break the blockades of both Ibn Sa'ud and the 'Iraq Government and throw Kuwait open to Mutair, on condition that the Duwish promised not to raid Kuwait any more. This agreement has since ripened into a regular alliance, and the Shaikh has undoubtedly not only opened Kuwait to Mutair but has helped the rebellious Akhwan, Ajman as well as Mutair, in every possible way. It is even reported that he has made gifts of money, arms and ammunition to Mutair, but this cannot at present be proved.

The Shaikh, however, does not of course desire entirely to alienate His Majesty's Government. He therefore denies his shady transactions with Mutair, and even endeavours to maintain an appearance of friendship by doling out occasional bits of intelligence to the Political Agent.

THE IBN HITHLAIN RAID.

It is not easy to prove anything against Ibn Subah in the case of the Ibn Hithlain raid, except in so far as it may be said that a large part of the tribal group subject to Kuwait and known as Araibdar, are themselves Ajman and that details of all the movements and intentions of the Akhwan Ajman are daily known in Kuwait. Moreover Ibn Subah had probably received a prior assurance from Ibn Hithlain that he would not raid Kuwait tribes. On his return from his successful raid on the 'Iraq shepherds Ibn Hithlain actually passed Jahrah and camped at Umm Rus, where, he divided the loot. Ibn Hithlain had only about 140 men, whereas Ibn Subah can certainly raise four or five hundred horse and camelm.

Yet





- 3 -

Yet not a shot was fired by the Kuwaitis. This may perhaps be attributed to the weakness or cowardice rather than treachery. Still weakness and cowardice are not desirable qualities in one who professes to be an ally.

Since then, however, affairs have become far worse. There can be little doubt, from innumerable reports, that Araibdar have been acting as regular spies for the Ajman and Mutair for the past month. In this connection, please see this office telegrams Nos. 333, 360 of 11-2-29, 12-2-29, respectively. Sa'ud ibn Hajruf is one of Ibn Subah's principal men.


IBN SHQAIR'S RAID.

The crowning disgrace of these altogether shady incidents, however, was the recent raid by Ibn Shqair.

As already explained to the Ministry, almost the whole of the Bani Malik dira has been awarded to Kuwait in the Anglo-Najd-Kuwait agreements. Ibn Subah has long been a patron of this tribe. At the time of Ibn Hithlain's raid, the greater part of Bani Malik fled to Safwan. A portion of the tribe, however, took refuge with Araibdar, with the idea of placing themselves under the protection of Ibn Subah. In accordance with this plan, it is reported that, on joining Araibdar, they visited Ibn Subah, and presented him with tribute in the form of "dhibihas". It is stated that this tribute was accepted. By Arab custom, the acceptance of such "khawa" involves a moral obligation to defend the giver, even with one's life. Anyone who does not propose to defend the givers of "khawa" should refuse to accept the latter.

Ibn Shqair and Al Fugham originally moved up, with the intention of raiding 'Iraq tribes in the Umm al Madafa-Raudhatain area, as had been successfully done by Ibn Hithlain. On reaching Aba al Hiran, however, (Abu al Haram on map) they received reports of air reconnaissances and car patrols in front of these tribes. They had no desire to fight a battle or risk losses, but, according to the almost invariable Akhwan habit, they hoped to surprise a camp which they could outnumber by ten to one, and massacre it without loss. They therefore abandoned the idea of raiding in the Umm al Madafa area, and went into camp.

At






- 4 -

(205) 176
At this stage, they heard of the presence of 'Iraq shepherds with Araibdar. They had received instructions from the Duwiah not to raid Araibdar themselves, as Ibn Subah was an ally of Mutair. But here was a small camp (about fifty men to their five hundred) of 'Iraq subjects, who had innocently placed themselves under the protection of an ally of the Duwiah. Ibn Shqair accordingly sent a messenger to Ibn Subah, warning him to move Araibdar away from the shepherds, as the Muslimin were about to raid the latter. On receiving this message, Araibdar hastily moved south and camped close to Mutair, leaving the shepherds alone at Jahrah. The latter fled to Kuwait where they camped beneath the walls of the town, and appealed to Ibn Subah. It is stated that Ibn Subah said to Ibn Shqair's messenger that Mutair could not raid the shepherds in their then position which was almost in Kuwait bazaar, but that they could do so as they liked if the shepherds moved a little way off.

Mutair accordingly picqueted the shepherd camp and also placed men in Kuwait town and Jahrah, to watch for any sign of movement by the shepherds. A patrol car from Bani Malik at Safwan, accompanied by a camel constable in plain clothes, at this time visited Jahrah to obtain news. They report that they saw a number of Akhwan camelmen staying in the house of one of Ibn Subah's men in Jahrah village. On enquiring they were told that these men were the scouts of Ibn Shqair's raiding party.

The shepherds at Kuwait at this time sent a message to the Administrative Inspector, asking for help. The Administrative Inspector cross questioned the messenger carefully as to whether the camp was in any danger at the moment. He, (the son of Shaikh of Bani Malik) replied "oh no ! they are quite safe where they are. They are almost in Kuwait town. But they cannot get out without risk, as they are surrounded by scouts of the raiders, who are also sitting in Kuwait and Jahrah". Nobody imagined it possible that Ibn Subah would allow the shepherds,

who,





- 5 -

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
who, to Arab ideas, were under his protection, to be raided at the very gates of his town. The Administrative Inspector therefore sent his telegram No. 558 of 28-2-29, to Air Headquarters, asking for assistance to escort the shepherds back from Kuwait, but, in Air Headquarters' telegram No. JB/1 of 1/3/29, the request was refused. He thereupon sent the messenger back to Bani Malik, with instructions to arrange a date with them on which he (the Administrative Inspector) with the police would meet and escort them back. The day after, however, the camp was raided.

The Administrative Inspector has since examined the tracks of Ibn Shqair's raiding party, when they advanced to attack. They crossed Al Shaaq north of Miniaqish and must have passed almost through the camps of Araibdar. While this march was of course accomplished at night, yet if Araibdar had sent word to the shepherds during the previous night or even an hour before the attack, the majority of them could have crowded into the market place within the ~~town~~ town walls.

It is even alleged that the night before the attack Ibn Subah sent messengers to warn Araibdar, but I have not found any proof of this allegation.

The attack took place on a level plain extending from the walls of the town to a distance of about three or four miles away. Police who examined the site state that the tracks of the charging horses of the raiders wheeled only a few hundred yards from the town walls. The noise of shots, and the shouts and shrieks of the combatants and victims, were heard by people in their houses in Kuwait.

As soon as the raid began, the Shaikh ordered the town gates to be closed. A number of the men of Bani Malik were inside the town. Mad with excitement at hearing the shout and cries of the sons and brothers outside, they struggled to get out to their assistance, but it is said that the Shaikh's men





- 6 -



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
men refused to open the gates and beat back the shepherds with blows and the flats of their swords. Meanwhile on the level plain outside the walls, the Akhwan were busy slaughtering. They outnumbered the shepherds by about ten to one. There was no way of escape, behind them was the sea, and to their flank the town walls. It is said that about four men took refuge in a ruined building near the walls, where they opened a heavy fire and repulsed their pursuers. The remainder of the camp was exterminated.



Never has the present writer heard of a more disgraceful or brutal incident in the history of Arabia. Kuwait is a large town and the Shaikh has hundreds of retainers. If these men had even manned the walls and opened the gates to the fugitives, some survivors could have found shelter.


MUSABLAH.


It is well known that all bedouins depend entirely on towns for the purchase of their necessities, and if access to towns can be forbidden to them, they can be brought to obedience without fighting. Now it is not a question of Ibn Subah maintaining neutrality between 'Iraq and Ibn Sa'ud. Mutair and their allies are outlaws, rebels against Ibn Sa'ud and hostile to His Majesty's Government and 'Iraq. Both Ibn Sa'ud and 'Iraq have for several months attempted to enforce a blockade against them, with the result that, by last autumn, they were in considerable straits. The Duwish then made a private agreement with Ibn Subah, promising security to the latter's subjects from Akhwan raids, on condition that the Shaikh supplied the rebels Akhwan with food and other necessities from Kuwait. The bargain has been observed. The Duwish has warned all the Akhwan that no Kuwait tribes are to be interfered with, and Kuwait town has been filled with Mutair caravans since last autumn up to the present day. Mutair have ample money, sheep and property taken in their























-3-

As regards the battle, the shepherds appear to have put up a magnificent resistance. It is now stated that they killed about thirty of the raiders, seventeen mares and many riding camels. It is thought that twenty five of the shepherds were killed, and about fifteen survived, having taken refuge in some detached buildings outside the walls.. The action raged for four hours, during any time of which the intervention of even thirty or forty fresh men from the town would have sufficed to repel the raiders. During all these hours, however, the gates remained closed. Crowds of spectators on the walls (the final scenes of the battle, as attested by the dead horses still lying there, were only two to four hundred yards from the walls) witnessed this tragic contest of five hundred against forty. Nothing more brutal can be imagined since the days of the Roman Gladiators. It is stated that the many men within the town, not only shepherds but sympathisers disgusted at this brutal slaughter, struggled to get out of the gates to assist the shepherds, but were prevented by the Shaikh's men. The Khirsan section were massacred and raided with others, inspite of their "khawa" and Ibn Subah's "Wajh".

Bani Malik are absolutely positive in their assertions that Araibdar themselves joined in the raid. Firstly there seems to be no doubt that the raiders, in the night march previous to the attack, actually passed through the Araibdar camps. If any man of Araibdar had cantered on ahead he could have warned the shepherds.

The latter swear that at least two of the mares killed were recognised as belonging to Araibdar. It is even said that one of the Hajruf Family, the Amirs of Araibdar under Ibn Subah, was killed. One Khalaif al Bashag, a Shaikh of the Shuraifat, alleges that his women, who stayed in his tent







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
tent during the raid, informed him that the raiders came into the tent accompanied by a woman, and began to loot. The woman asked to whom the tent belonged, and on being told Khalaif al Bashag, she said to the raiders "Khatiya ! let us leave Khalaif's tent". It is of course unknown for women to accompany a raid and anyhow a Mutair woman would not know who Khalaif al Bashag was. The shepherds believe that these people were from some Araibdar camps close by. Flight Lieut. Howes informs me that he knows the name of at least one man of Araibdar who was with the raiders.


I do not imagine that the Shaikh of Kuwait would order Araibdar to raid the shepherds. In fact, if they did so, the Shaikh was probably unaware of the fact until after it had occurred. Bedouins are naturally covetous and all sorts of rag-tag and bobtail join in raids. Still the Shaikh is responsible for his tribes.


After the bombing, a large number of Bani Malik sheep and donkeys scattered about the vicinity and were collected by Araibdar. The shepherds went out with a representative of the Shaikh and collected what they could find. They complain, however, that Araibdar extorted money from them before consenting to hand over their property. One man says that he was compelled to pay Rs.15/- to recover three of his donkeys. The average value of a donkey is about Rs.8/- each, so that, if his statement is true, he very nearly bought his donkeys back. Another man alleges that he was made to pay Rs.5/- for two donkeys. I was informed by the shepherds that a minor chief of the Bani Malik called Hajji Za'airi, was killed in the raid, and his mare wounded. All his worldly property was looted. The mare was subsequently caught by Ibn Subah's men and taken to the Shaikh.


























CONFIDENTIAL.

British Residency and Consulate-General,
Bushire, 26th March 1929.

No. 14.

Sir,

In continuation of my despatch No. 13, dated

19th March 1929,

1. Kuwait telegram No. 182, dated 19-3-1929.	I have the
2. Bahrain " 43, " 20-3-1929.	honour to
3. " " 44, " " "	forward for the
4. Kuwait " 196, " 21-3-1929.	information of
5. Bahrain " 46, " 21-3-1929.	His Majesty's
6. Kuwait " 205, " 22-3-1929.	Government copies
7. " " 207, " " "	of telegrams
8. Bushire, " 200, " 23-3-1929.	
9. " " 205, " " "	
10. Kuwait " 212, " 25-3-1929.	

noted in the margin.

I have the honour to be,


Sir,


Your most obedient,

humble servant,

Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

HIS MAJESTY'S SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR THE COLONIES,
COLONIAL OFFICE,
LONDON.





CONFIDENTIAL.

No. 86-S. of 1929.

British Residency and Consulate-General,

Bushire, 26th March 1929.

From

The Hon'ble Sir F.W. Johnston, K.C.I.E., C.S.I.,
Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To

The Foreign Secretary to the Government of India,
New Delhi.


Sir,


In continuation of my endorsement No. 75-S., dated the 9th March 1929, I have the honour to forward a copy of a letter No. S.O. 673, dated the 21st March 1929, from the Political Secretary to the High Commissioner for Iraq, Baghdad, and of my telegraphic reply No. 210, dated the 26th March 1929.


2. There has of late been noticeable a tendency on the part of the High Commissioner to desire to deal direct with the Kuwait Agency in all matters, and, while I can see no objection, in fact distinct advantage, in the Political Agent, Kuwait's sending direct to Baghdad telegrams containing information or statements of fact that are useful and urgent, there seems to be the strongest objection to any direct correspondence on questions of policy as in the present case.

3. As regards the subject matter of the letter, there would seem to be no advantage in offering any

criticism









6/14 220
191
H. C. F. 16.

SGPS . 621...1081...5,000...18 9 2a.

SECRET.
No. S.O. 638

SECRETARIAT OF H. E. THE HIGH
COMMISSIONER FOR 'IRAQ.

Baghdad, 16th March, 1929.

By direction of His Excellency the High Commissioner for 'Iraq, a copy of correspondence as marked below is forwarded with compliments to :—

The Secretary to the
Political Resident
in the Persian Gulf,
B U S H I R E .


H.B.M.'s Agent & Consul,
J I D D A H .


Political Secretary
to H. E. The High Commissioner for 'Iraq.

Enclosures :—

Despatch Secret A dated the 16th March, 1929, to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, London, on the subject of the activities of Akhwan raiding parties in the neighbourhood of the 'Iraq frontier.

U.





SECRET. A

The Residency,
Baghdad, 16th March, 1929.


Sir,

I have the honour to transmit for your information the enclosed brief summary of the activities of Akhwan raiding parties in the neighbourhood of the 'Iraq frontier during the past three months and to invite your attention to the following considerations which are suggested by this summary :-

i) The most striking feature of the summary is the number of occasions on which raids have been threatened or attempted by Akhwan tribesmen but have failed to materialise. On one occasion only has an Akhwan raiding party penetrated into 'Iraq territory - I refer to the attempted raid by Ibn Ashwan near Jumaimah on December 29th - and on that occasion the raiders were immediately located and bombed by machines of the Royal Air Force. Where 'Iraq tribes have been successfully raided in Kuwait or Najd territory, those tribes had, contrary to, or in ignorance of, Captain Glubb's orders, strayed in search of grazing beyond the zones of safety

afforded

The Right Hon'ble
L.C.M.S. Amery, P.C., M.P.,
Secretary of State for the Colonies,
Downing Street, London, S. W. 1.





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
afforded by the desert posts and by the mobile forces allotted for tribal protection.


ii) The failure of so many attempted raids must be attributed mainly to the defensive measures taken in the southern desert area. These measures comprise, first, the collection and rapid communication to headquarters of intelligence regarding the movements and intentions of Akhwan raiding parties, secondly the withdrawal of scattered tribes from threatened districts and their concentration in areas where they can be to some extent controlled and protected (a task which has been greatly complicated by the lack of water and grazing in the southern desert) and thirdly the maintenance of a close watch on threatened points and the prompt location and engagement of raiding parties.

iii) In connection with the desert posts which play an important part in these defence measures ~~posts~~ both as administrative and intelligence centres and also as advanced bases for air and ground forces, you will observe that whereas the Akhwan leaders have at various times expressed their intention of destroying them, the raiders have in point of fact been careful to keep at a respectful distance and have concentrated on areas, such as northern Kuwait, where no such posts exist.

iv) At the same time, although many attempted raids have been frustrated, the raiders are not entirely deterred thereby from renewing their attempts. I

believe







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believe this to be largely due to the fact that it has not so far been possible to strike a decisive blow at the raiders who have on more than one occasion been able to escape across the frontier with their loot.

2. I have thought it advisable to bring these points to your notice, because it seems possible that the fact that threatened raids have so often failed to materialise may give the erroneous impression that the threats never existed. King Ibn Sa'ud has indeed protested recently against the circulation of alarmist rumours of impending raids which he claims to be unfounded. Actually, as you will observe from the enclosed summary, these so called rumours have usually been fully substantiated. King Ibn Sa'ud has also contended, as reported in telegram No.28 dated the 10th of March, 1929, from His Majesty's Agent and Consul, Jiddah, to the Foreign Office, that the raiding propensities of certain of his tribesmen are due to military measures and concentrations on the 'Iraq side of the frontier. As I have shown, the necessary and justifiable defence measures taken on the 'Iraq side of the frontier have in fact been instrumental in averting a number of raids with their attendant loss of life and property. That the raiding propensities of the Akhwan have not been more efficiently discouraged seems due rather to the fact that the military measures taken on the 'Iraq side





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side of the frontier have been purely defensive and that, out of regard to the existing agreements, the frontier has at all times been scrupulously respected.

3. A copy of this despatch is being sent to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire, and to His Majesty's Agent and Consul at Jiddah.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,



Your most obedient,


humble servant,

(Sgd.) Gilbert Clayton

ACTING HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR 'IRAQ.

T.C.





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Summary of the activities of Akhwan raiding parties during
period 15th December, 1928 - 3rd March, 1929.

1. Mutair raiding parties in Jumaimah area.

<u>Leader.</u>	<u>Strength.</u>	<u>Date of raid.</u>	<u>Remarks.</u>
Al Maraikhi (Mutair, Braih).	30 men on 16 camels.	Between 15th & 23rd Decr. 1928.	Raided from Al Jalt but turned back from Saddat al Batn. Con- firmed from many sources and by eye witnesses.
Jatli ibn Rashid (Mutair, Braih) Ubaiyat sub-section.	20 men on 15 camels.	- do -	Raided Jalaid section of Daham- shah at Rafha a few miles west of Jumaimah, took 12 camels and household gear and killed a mare.
Ibn Ghunaim (Mutair, Braih).	8 camelmen.	- do -	Attempted to raid Dahamshah near Jumaimah but failed to secure loot.
Ibn Rushden (Mutair).	About 30 men.	- do -	The details of this raid were never definitely confirmed, but the raiders were reported to have entered Kuwait territory and then turned back.
Manahi ibn Ashwan (Mutair, Ubaiyat).	150 camel-men.	29th Decr. 1928.	Attempted to raid Shepherds at Jumaimah but was bombed.
Lafi ibn Mu'allath (Mutair).	About 30 camelmen.	30th Decr. 1928.	Proceeded towards Jumaimah but met enroute with Ibn Ashwan's raiders who had been bombed and returned back.

2.



اعرض على مكتبة قطر الرقمية: http://www.qdl.qa/archive/81055/vdc_100023663088.0x000039



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
2. Gaisuma concentration.

At the end of December reports from many sources indicated the presence of a large concentration of Najd tribesmen at Gaisuma threatening the 'Iraq Anaizah in the Wadian area. Precautionary measures were taken and maintained until January 11, when reports showed that threatened raid had been abandoned and the concentration dispersed. The bombing of the Mutair raiding party near Jumaimah on December 29 may have been a contributory factor.

3. Ajman & Mutair raiding parties in Kuwait.

<u>Date.</u>	<u>Leader.</u>	<u>Estimated strength.</u>	<u>Remarks.</u>
Jany. 21.	Dhaidan ibn Hithlain (Ajman). Ibn Lami (Mutair).	200-300 men.	Raided 'Iraq shepherd tribes 35 miles south of Zubair in Kuwait territory.
Feb. 14.	Ibn Hithlain (Ajman). Ibn Shuqair (Mutair). Ibn Fughm (Mutair).	1000 men.	Set out from Maraj al Suban about Feb. 14 intending to raid in Northern Kuwait on 16th. Reached Umm al Amarah where they learned from scouts that 'Iraq tribes were protected by cars and aeroplanes. Abandoned raid and returned south.
Feb. 22.	Ibn Shuqair (Mutair). Ibn Fughm (Mutair).	200 men.	Set out to raid 'Iraq and Kuwait tribes at Umm Rus in Kuwait territory. Tribes received warning and concentrated at Jahrah. On discovering this, raiders turned back.
March 3.	Ibn Shuqair. Ibn Fughm.	600 men.	Attacked Bani Malik section outside walls of Kuwait town. Located and bombed by aircraft 20 miles south of Kuwait on same day.

4.





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
4. Ataibah raiding parties in Hazul area.



Feb. 19.	Mohd. ibn Jabrin.	800 men.	Raided 'Iraq Zaiyad section in Najd territory near Muwadhkir.
Feb. 19.	Muhsin.	1000 men.	Raided Shammar and Dahamshah sections near Gaisuma.
Feb. 19.	Sultan ibn Humaid.	1200 men.	Went to Jumaimah to raid 'Iraq Ajib sections; found latter had withdrawn and consequently turned back.



5. Activities of Faisal al Dawish.



Reports indicate that Faisal al Dawish (Mutair) intended to raid 'Iraq tribes in the Abtiyyah area simultaneously with Ibn Humaid's raid from the Hazul area. It is confirmed from many sources that during the last week in February, he set out on a raid in the direction of Abtiyyah and reached Dulaimiyah in the neutral zone. There is scouts reported that the 'Iraq tribes were concentrated and protected by cars. He therefore abandoned the raid and retreated to Hafar neighbourhood. 'Iraq police scouts found tracks of raiding party estimated at 800 men at Dulaimiyah.


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














5. The charge that Nejdian tribes have been illegally threatened with expulsion while camped in Iraq (see Mr. Bird's telegram No. 20 of the 10th February and Fuad Hamza's note of the 5th February enclosed in Mr. Bird's despatch No. 46 of the 10th February) is in complete contradiction with the complaint that Captain Glubb was seducing the Nejdian Shammar from their allegiance to Ibn Saud, put forward in Fuad Hamza's note of the 31st December last, of which a copy was enclosed in your despatch No. 17 of the 8th January. The attitude of the Iraqi authorities in regard to the movements of Nejdian tribesmen across the frontier, and their anxiety to fulfil the obligations which they have undertaken towards Ibn Saud in this respect, were explained in Sir H. Dobbs's letter of the 5th January to King Ibn Saud, of which a copy was forwarded to you direct in Mr. Bourdillon's letter No. S.O. 24 of the same date, and in Mr. Bourdillon's telegrams Nos. 74 and 75 of the 20th February to the Colonial Office, referred to above. In view of the explanations already given to King Ibn Saud and the Hejazi Government on this point, Sir Austen Chamberlain considers that little would be gained by continuing this correspondence and returning detailed replies to the recent series of complaints. You may, however, communicate to the Hejazi Government, orally, the substance of Mr. Bourdillon's telegrams Nos. 74 and 75 to the Colonial Office, if you think it desirable to do so, and you should in any case inform the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs in writing that full explanations have already been given to the Hejazi Government on this subject, and that, after close investigation, His Majesty's Government are satisfied that there is no foundation for the allegations which have been made against Captain Glubb's activities, which are clearly based upon inaccurate reports. You should add that the continued presentation of baseless protests can only further complicate an already difficult situation, and you may point out the obvious interest which such admittedly recalcitrant tribes as the Mutair must have, in representing their delinquencies as the result of Iraqi provocation. If the Hejazi Government prefer to give greater credence to their own sources of information than to the official assurances of His Majesty's Government, their action can only remain a matter of regret to His Majesty's Government.

6. You should at the same time request Sheikh Fuad Hamza orally, with reference to his note of the 31st December, to produce, in original, the documents alleged to be in Captain Glubb's handwriting and stated to prove his interference in the affairs of Nejdian tribes. You should, in making this request, explain that His Majesty's Government had no previous knowledge of the existence of these documents and clearly cannot accept them as genuine without close examination of the originals, said to be in the hands of the Hejazi Government.

7. As regards article 6 of the Bahra Agreement, the Secretary of State approves the language held on this subject by Mr. Bird, as reported in paragraph 5 of his despatch No. 48 of the 10th February. The Secretary of State realises that Ibn Saud is unlikely to acquiesce in the attitude adopted by His Majesty's Government in this matter, but the obligations of His Majesty's Government render it indispensable that that attitude should be maintained. You should accordingly address a separate written communication to the Hejazi Government on this question, confirming the statements made by Mr. Bird, as reported in paragraph 5 (but not the other paragraphs) of his despatch No. 48, and explaining, in reply to Ibn Saud's letter of the 23rd January, that the statement made by His Majesty in that letter, to the effect that His Majesty's Government are now attempting to attach a condition to their undertaking to be bound by the article, does not correctly represent the position. On the contrary, His Majesty's Government have assured the Hejazi Government that they intend to observe the provisions of that article, and they recognise that British forces in Iraq, as well as Iraqi forces, are covered by its terms. The position is, indeed, that His Majesty's Government have every intention and desire to observe the provisions of the article, and will naturally continue to do so, so long as a normal situation exists. They have, however, thought it only fair to warn the Hejazi Government that, in the event of a situation of grave danger to Iraq being brought about by the actual occurrence of a serious attack on a large scale against a township in Iraq, or of continuous raiding by Nejdian tribes, which the Hejazi Government prove unable to prevent or punish, His Majesty's Government must reserve their liberty of action and their right to take the necessary measures against those guilty of the attack, if this should prove, in their opinion, the only means of defending the Iraqi tribes, for whose safety they are responsible, from further aggression. If, however, the Hejazi Government would establish the same degree of control over their tribes as has recently been enforced by the Iraqi Government, who



have effectively restrained their tribes from raiding into Nejd, there would be no occasion for British forces to cross the frontier in any circumstances and thus no hesitation on the part of His Majesty's Government in falling in with the wishes of the Hejazi Government in the matter of article 6 of the Bahra Agreement.

8. You should add orally that His Majesty's Government feel bound to point out that they cannot in any case allow unprovoked raiding against Iraqi tribes to continue with the almost complete impunity which the raiders at present enjoy. Six raids against Iraqi tribes have taken place since the end of December last, and, so far as His Majesty's Government are aware, no effective action has yet been taken by the Hejazi Government to punish the offenders or to make reparation for the Iraqi losses. These raids have not only resulted in heavy losses to Iraqi tribes, but have led to the death of a British aircraftsman and of an American missionary. The latest of these raids has been reported by the British air officers engaged to have been of a particularly impudent nature, in that the raiders, having recrossed the Nejd frontier, and relying upon their immunity from pursuit in virtue of article 6 of the Bahra Agreement, halted in the open and, within easy reach of British aircraft, proceeded to the distribution of their loot. In the face of such provocation, His Majesty's Government cannot be expected to hold their hand indefinitely.

I am, &c.

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN.

Enclosure 1 in No. 1.

Telegram from the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the High Commissioner for Iraq.

(Sent 12.30 p.m., March 5, 1929.)

(No. 84.)

MARCH 5. Your telegram 19th February, No. 74. Was Ibn Saud ever notified of the Iraq Government officials authorised to correspond direct with the Amir of Hail, and is there any foundation for the Hejaz Foreign Minister's statement that Captain Glubb was not included among officials so authorised (see enclosure in Jeddah despatch of 8th January, No. 17, to Foreign Office)?

Enclosure 2 in No. 1.


Telegram from the High Commissioner for Iraq to the Secretary of State for the Colonies dated March 7.—(Received Colonial Office, March 7, 1929.)


(Confidential.)

No. 102 of 7th March.

Your telegram No. 84. See Dobbs's telegram No. 65 S, 23rd April, 1926, to Jeddah, repeated to you under No. 175, and Jeddah's reply of 1st May, 1926, repeated to the Foreign Office under No. 46. On 19th May, 1926, Ibn Saud was informed that the necessary instructions had been sent to Mutesarrif, Basra, Muntafiq and Diwaniyah (no names were mentioned), and he replied in July confirming arrangements for direct correspondence between Hail and the local Iraq authorities, "particularly those mentioned." Though Ibn Saud was not specifically informed of Glubb's appointment to the southern desert Liwa, which was formed in 1928 and includes the desert portion of three Liwas mentioned, it was referred to during Jeddah negotiations in May 1928.

I think objection to Glubb personally emanates from Fuad Hamza himself rather than Ibn Saud, who would be unlikely to support such unwarranted aspersions on our sincerity or Glubb's honesty of purpose.







Telegram F.

From. Political Agent, Kuwait.
To. Political Resident, Bushire.
No. 233.
Dated 27th (recd 28th) March 1929.

I have received unexpectedly by aeroplane
Political Secretary's 673 and my comments will be
sent to you by slow mail at latest and earlier if
possible.

Above has reference to my telegram No 227.





Telegram P.

From. High Commissioner, Baghdad.
To. Political Resident, Bushire.
No. 32-S.
Dated and Recd. 27th March 1929.

It is hoped that before end of month when concentration will be no longer necessary Iraq troops will be removed from Kuwait. As the period of extension will thus be so short you will perhaps think it unnecessary to approach Sheikh officially. Foregoing refers to your telegram of ~~22~~ 23rd March.

Telegram P.

From. Political Resident, Bushire.
To. Political Agent, Kuwait.
No. 218.
Dated the 27th March 1929.


I think it would be a mistake not to get the formal assent of the Sheikh but I am sure he will give this.

Foregoing refers to Baghdad telegram of the 27th March No 32-S which is repeated as follows
Begins It is X X 23rd March
Ends

Telegram P.

From. Political Agent, Kuwait.
To. Political Resident, Bushire.
No. 249.
Dated 29th (recd 30th) March 1929.

I have asked Sheikh and he has assented.
Above refers to your telegram No 218.





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Telegram Code
From Political Kuwait
To Resident Bushire
No.226
Dated the 27th (received 28th) March 1929.


Following is repetition of Glubb's wireless telegraph message No.902 of 26th March, begins "Agent of Mutair usually reliable reports that Muhsin Al Firm and Ajami Suwait captured 17 flocks of camels from members of Ibn Humaid's raiders returning home three weeks ago. Suleiman Anqari, Religious Sheikh, visited Ibn Humaid from Ibn Saud and offered peaceful settlement by religious laws. Ibn Humaid refused. 2 armies believed now about 20 miles north of Zilfi. 7 days ago skirmish of horsemen took place between armies and one mare was killed. Rumoured that Ibn Saud has 9 pieces of artillery and many cars. Ibn Musaad, Muti'in Al-Firm Riwola and Shammar concentrated at Ajlibeh. Last fortnight numerous parties of Buvlih Mutair raided Subae and other tribes loyal to Ibn Saud and looted many camels. Ibn Hithlain, Ibn Shuqair and Fuqm and (deed) Jaryah /30 ~~miles~~ miles north." ends.


PR.


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
- POLITICAL -


PC, rank of 7.3.
Colonel.
Muscat.






































































































Telegram P.

From Political Resident, Bushire.

To High Commissioner for Iraq, Baghdad.

Repeated Political Agent, Kuwait.

No. 232.

Dated 2nd April 1929.


Shaikh has already consented to short extension of time after 1st April. Please state more explicitly measures you desire Shaikh's consent to taking thereafter.


Foregoing refers to your 33-S., dated 1st April.


- Resident.


PC sent to J. under no. 4
Colmis - no. 4
Muscat & Bahrain


no
7/4















Telegram Code
From Political Kuwait
To Resident Bushire
Repeated Highcoma, Baghdad, Basra and Glubb.
No. 262
Dated 2nd (received 3rd) April 1929.


Man believed to be reliable arrived
Uraibdar camp reports that he left Jarab on 9th March
Ibn Humaid and Dawish whose united forces amount to
7,000 men both left there that day for Sibilah. He
heard from Mutair in Summan whom he left 27th March that
both had since moved into Zilfi. Ibn Saud's forces
believed to be at Jalah. Negotiations were in progress
and Dawish was anxious for peace but Ibn Humaid was more
stubborn.

- POLITICAL -


P.R. Harrison
JR






















(2) .

what I say:-

On the 21st March he wrote to me that some men of the Dhafir had complained that, as they were returning from Kuwait the previous evening, they had been attacked near Jahrah by two parties of camelmén - one of three and the other of four men. The Dhafir had succeeded in driving off their assailants who had retired to a camp of the 'Uraibdar near by. I gave Captain Glubb's man a letter to the Shaikh and told him to take the actual Dhafir to whom the alleged incident had occurred with him so that they could give him all possible details. They, however, told a totally different story from what Captain Glubb had written. They said that when they got to near the Mutlá' (four miles on the other side of Jahrah) on their way to - not from - Kuwait, they saw a man watching them from some little distance off and another man with three camels. They called out and asked if they were Dhafir, whereupon the man went to the camels and they all went off towards the north, where they presumably went to a camp of the Zaiyad tribe of 'Iraq - there were certainly no 'Uraibdar in that direction. The Dhafir further said that they had never actually seen Captain Glubb himself at all.

On the 24th March Captain Glubb wrote to me that he was sending in one of his men to me who said that he, with representatives of the Bani Malik, had found six sheep belonging to the latter with one of the 'Uraibdar. This man had alleged that he had bought the sheep from a caravan coming down from Najd. His man consequently had left the sheep, as custom does not permit the forcible restitution of of animals found in the possession of a friendly tribe who who bought them from the enemy. In view, however, of a previous case in which the Shaikh had pointed out that it is the Bedouin custom that if anyone recognize his property in a case of this sort, and can produce witnesses to prove that it is his, it is his right to have it returned to him without having to compensate the man who had bought it, and that







(3)

it is up to the latter to get his money back from the man he bought it from, and that anyone who buys an animal from another without safeguarding himself with a definite assurance, given by the seller in the presence of witnesses, that the money will be returned if the beast is proved to belong to someone else, obviously does so at his own risk, - with which ruling, although it unquestionably is in accordance with custom, Captain Glubb does not agree. He urged however that it should be applied to these six sheep. On inquiry it turned out that the man of the 'Uraibdār with whom they were found had only just bought them from another man. The latter was questioned at the time, and proved to the satisfaction of everyone, including Captain Glubb's man, that four out of the six animals had belonged to, and been bred by, Kuwait Arabs, and that only two were alleged to have been bought from the Ikhwān. Captain Glubb's man afterwards acknowledged to me personally that this was the case. The two which had been bought from the Ikhwan and had belonged to the Bani Mālik were sold by the Shaikh's orders and their value value sent to their original owners.

I quote the above cases, not in any carping spirit at Captain Glubb's work, and indeed I admire his ability and like him personally very much, but merely to show that he has a distinct bias, and that, able as he undoubtedly is, he is very far from being infallible. You will undoubtedly have noticed yourself how very inaccurate he is regarding the history of Kuwait at the beginning of his note No. 754 dated the 12/15th March 1929. It was of course in the late Shaikh Sālim's days that the tribes were lost to Kuwait, the 'Awāzīm, the old Kuwait tribe par excellence, being seduced from his allegiance by Ibn Sa'ūd in retaliation for his action over the 'Ajmān. It was indeed inevitable that, with the Ikhwān "revival", tribes should prefer to be on their side rather than against them, and should transfer their allegiance to Ibn Sa'ūd accordingly. When Shaikh Ahmad first became Ruler of Kuwait, he had, as now, no tribes other than






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
the 'Uraibda'.

In this connection it might not be out of place to point out that the 'Uraibda' are not a tribe, as one would imagine from paragraph 77 of Intelligence Report No.6 dated the 13th March 1929, issued by the Secretariat of His Excellency the High Commissioner for 'Iraq, but are, as their name implies the "Household Arabs" of Kuwait. They are also sometimes called Fidawiyah, and are usually spoken of by the Shaikh himself as 'our servants'. Actually they belong to various tribes: Rashaidah, 'Ajman, Mutair, etc., all of which however are of the Najd type.

To revert to Captain Glubb's notes: it is perfectly true, of course, that the Mutair are allowed to buy supplies in Kuwait, and I absolutely agree with Captain Glubb that an agreement has undoubtedly been arrived at by which the Kuwait 'Uraibda' are to be left in peace in return for this privilege. The Shaikh naturally never told me when he made this agreement, and has no doubt all along been nervous that we might stem in and force him to close Kuwait to the Mutair - which from his point of view would mean plunging his country into a state of insecurity similar to that of last year, and denying a source of trade to his subjects. He has however always said that Kuwait is open to all who like to come to trade there. This is certainly as far as he has gone, and to say that this agreement has ripened a regular alliance and that the Shaikh helps the rebellious Ikhwan in every way possible, is, in my opinion, merely absurd.

With regard to Ibn Hithlain's raid on 21st January, I can show that he definitely tried to frustrate it in so far as he could without embroiling himself with the Ikhwan, as, as soon as he received information about it, in addition to informing me (which he could hardly help doing) he sent a private telegram to Zubair for a taxi to be sent out to warn as many shepherds as possible, and it was this taxi coming back which the late Mr. Bilkert and his party met shortly before they were fired on. I agree







(5)

of course that he probably could, and if so certainly should, have taken active steps against the raiders as the raid was in his territory. That he did not say, I think, safely be attributed to weakness and his dread of getting embroiled in the quarrel again.

With regard to Ibn Shuqair's raid on the Bani Málík, the incident in which Ibn Shuqair is alleged to have sent a messenger to the Shaikh, warning him to move the 'Uraibdár away from the shepherds, is probably the same in origin as that reported in my telegram No.85 dated the 23rd February, in which I reported that "A few families of Kuwait and 'Iraq tribes camped at Umm Ruús were warned by a man of the 'Ajman late last night that a small raiding party under Ibn Shuqair, Fuqm and Ibn Lání was about to attack them. He advised them to move at once which they did and came into Jahrah this morning, Saturday. The Shaikh has sent a warning by car to the tribes south-east of Jahrah". The warning may have been intended for the 'Uraibdár alone, but I think there is no doubt that the Shaikh passed it on to all alike, so he can hardly be blamed if it was.

On the 28th February I received a telegram from His Excellency the High Commissioner to the effect that it was reported that fifty tents of the Bani Málík who had been camped with the 'Uraibdár had received warning of a raid and fled to Kuwait town, but had been driven away by the Shaikh and were camped between Jahrah and Kuwait, and asking me to warn them to fall back on the main concentration of 'Iraq tribes at Umm al-Madáfi'ah. I saw the Shaikh at once, and he told me that he had already advised them to join the other 'Iraq tribes where they would be safer, as there was not room for them as well as the 'Uraibdár to take refuge within the walls of Jahrah in case of need. He said he was very glad to hear that the High Commissioner wanted them to go, as their flocks made an attractive "bait" for raiders and he did not like having them there when he could not adequately protect them. At my request he said he







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
would convey H.E. the High Commissioner's warning to them. The above is no doubt the origin of ^{what} Shaikh 'Abdullah al-Jábir (who incidentally is the Shaikh's second cousin, not his brother) is alleged to have said, and also of the story about the Shaikh having said that Government had told him to evict the shepherds and not protect them - both in garbled form.


On the 1st March a deputation of four of the Bani Málík came to see me and said that the Shaikh had sent word to them that he could no longer be responsible for their safety, that a telegram had come from the 'Iraq Government that they were to join the other 'Iraq tribes, and that they were not to stop there any longer. I told them that the telegram was one which I had received from H.E. the High Commissioner, who wanted them to go where they would be safe. They said they quite realized that they would be perfectly safe if they once got there, but that there were so many spies about that they dare not risk the journey, and asked me to request the High Commissioner that an escort might be provided for them. I accordingly telegraphed to H.E. the High Commissioner conveying their request in my telegram No. 112 of 1st March, at the same time telling the Shaikh that I was doing so, and asking him to let them remain here and make the best arrangements he could for their safety pending a reply. This was on the 1st March, and the blow fell on the morning of the 3rd, before any reply had been received.


With regard to the actual happenings on the morning of the 3rd March. The first I knew that anything was happening was to hear the firing when I was out for a walk in the early morning. I then saw a horseman gallop in the direction of the Shaikh's palace, and heard that the Bani Málík were being raided. I hurried back to the Political Agency, where I met the Shaikh just arriving to tell me the news in a state of great flurry & distress














(9)

than this.

As regards the merits of his policy: there is nothing gallant or noble about it, it is true; but it has opened up a certain amount of trade for his people, and it has saved his ~~people~~ tribesmen from being raided, and all his subjects from the fear of attack to which they were exposed last year. Consequently, I think we can say that in the interests of his own subjects it is probably the best policy which he could have followed.


From the British point of view, his policy is certainly somewhat annoying in so far as our interests in 'Iraq are concerned. On the other hand it saves us the inconvenience and expense of keeping one or more of His Majesty's Ships here, as we had to do for so long last year, and as we would almost certainly have to do again if the Shaikh were again to incur the hostility of the Ikhwan.


The Shaikh would, I know, be the first to own, as is indeed patent to everyone, that Kuwait owes its independence to us alone, and consequently I think we have every right dictate what policy the Shaikh should follow in a matter of this sort, and to force him to abandon any policy which we consider opposed to our interests.

I have already expressed my opinion, in my telegram No. 210 of 24th March 1929, as to what action we should take in the event of Ibn Sa'ud defeating the tribes which are now flouting his authority, and the latter wishing to take refuge in Kuwait, and you have endorsed that opinion.

It only remains, therefore, to consider whether it is, or is not, to our interests as a whole to compel the Shaikh to abandon his present policy now, and to close Kuwait forthwith to the Mutair and other Ikhwan tribes who are now defying Ibn Sa'ud's authority. Now that the 'Iraq tribes are leaving Kuwait territory again it is really only this question of the blockade which

concerns





(10)


our interests in 'Iraq at all. In this connection I would point out that the Special Service Officer, Kuwait, said in his message No. HK/85 dated the 28th March 1929 that an agent whom he considers very knowledgeable had suggested that Ibn Sa'ud was attempting to weaken resistance by waiting until the rebels' supplies are exhausted, when he hopes they will either surrender or attack him. This man had stated that caravans which visit Kuwait are totally inadequate to replenish rebel supplies, and that all other desert ports are closed to them. This tallies entirely with my opinion, which is that this question of musabalah with Kuwait - although certainly an important one - is hardly as important as Captain Glubb leads one to suppose. On the whole I am inclined to think that the advantages which we would gain in 'Iraq by forcing Kuwait to close its doors to the Ikhwan would be more than outweighed by the disadvantages of having to protect Kuwait - as we would almost certainly have to do. This is, however, of course a matter of opinion.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your most obedient servant,

J.C. Moore
Lieut.-Colonel,
Political Agent, Kuwait.





62/14

No. 260-S. Political Agency, Kuwait.
1st April 1929.

226
267

To
The Secretary to the Hon'ble the Political Resident
in the Persian Gulf,
B U S H I R E.


BUSHIRE RESIDENCY.
Reg. No. 300
Date 6-4-29
CONFIDENTIAL RECORDS.


Copies of the undermentioed messages despatched
by the Special Service Officer, Kuwait, are forwarded here-
with for information.

J. C. Moore
Lt.-Col.,
Political Agent, Kuwait.

No. HK/72 dated the 19th March 1929.
" HK/ " " 27th " "
" HK/ " " 27th " "
" HK/84 " " 28th " "
" HK/85 " " 28th " "
" HK/87 " " 30th " "
" HK/91 " " 31st " "

PR ksa mrdm







Telegram Enclair
From Howes Kuwait
To Aviation Baghdad
Repeated Glubb and Special Basrah.
No.HK/72
Dated 19th March 1929.


Reported Duwish sent message to
Ibn Saud on behalf Ibn Humaid offering return
loot taken from Najd tribes. Latter refused saying
rebels must come in and submit their case to Shara
failing which he would attack them. Ibn Saud reported
to have 40 war banners including Ibn Lwai, Ibn Rubai'an,
Ibn Busaiyis and al Firm. Mutair returning from Ibn
Humaid's last raid reported deprived of their loot by
Harb. Ibn Hathlain and al Fughm said to be at Haraib
Ibn Shuqair at Jariya Jiblan and Braih in Subhan west
of As Safa.


Telegram Enclair
From Howes Kuwait
To Aviation Baghdad
Repeated Glubb and Special Basrah.
No.HK
Dated 27th March 1929.

Ibn Humaid reported at Sibella said to
be about 9 miles south Zilfi. Duwish said to be in
constant correspondence with Ibn Saud regarding amicable
settlement. Reported that Braih set out to raid Harb on
shepherds near Thamami and have not yet returned but
this may refer to raid previously reported.











Telegram Enclaire
From Howes Kuwait
To Aviation Baghdad
Repeated Glubb and Special Basrah
No.HK/84
Dated the 28th March 1929.

Awazim caravan of Ibn Dral left wafrah yesterday arrived Kuwait today confirm Ibn Hathlain invited them join him at Haraib. They agreed to do so but have not yet moved. From another source reported that one section have joined Ibn Hathlain. Motive for invitation probably Ibn Hathlain fears Mutair and considered not unlikely he is changing sides and supporting Ibn Saud. No confirmation here yet that Mutair raided Ibn Hathlain but Jiblan section when capturing Ibn Jilluw's two herds may have taken Ajman camels as well or Ibn Majid in his raid on Ibn Al Jaba likely to have looted Ajman camels. Messenger of Shaikh Kuwait despatched 10 days ago to Ibn Saud now returned. Hope forward this news later.







Telegram Enclaire
From Howes Kuwait
To Aviation Baghdad
Repeated Glubb and Special Basrah
No. HK/85
Dated 28th March 1929.

Reference my HK/ of 27th March.


Sibella now more reliably placed about 18 miles NNE of Zilfi. Reference reports of looting camels from Ibn Jilluwi and Ibn Saud agent states six herds were taken from Abu Dha'ar nephew of Ibn Jilluwi living in Miyadh by Mutair in Summan. Probably both reports refer same incident. Same agent very knowledgeable suggests Ibn Saud attempting weaken resistance by waiting till rebels supplies exhausted when he hopes they will either surrender or attack him. States caravans which visit Kuwait totally inadequate replenish rebel supplies and all other desert ports closed to them.






Telegram Enclaire
From Howes Kuwait
To Aviation Baghdad
Repeated Glubb and Special Basrah.
No.HK/87
Dated the 30th March 1929.


Traveller from Mutair reports following.
Farhan Ibn Mashur (Ruwallah) joined Ibn Humaid and in
consequence Ibn Musaad despatched force Shaibah near
Bail and destroyed Ibn Mashur's fort there. Ibn Ashwan
did not respond to Duwish's summons rallying Mutair.
Recent raid by Mutair on Sebei led by relative of Sultan
ibn Muhailib and same raid also looted camels from Ajman.
Both raided sections however said to have then camped with
Mutair. Reports still conflicting as to Awazim joining
Ibn Hathlain.








Telegram Enclaire
From Howes Kuwait
To Aviation Baghdad
Repeated Glubb and Special Basrah
No.HK/91
Dated the 31st March 1929.


Al Nafisi Ibn Saud's agent here received news yesterday by mail steamer that Ibn Saud's forces under son Saud at Sarif and Ibn Musaad's force at Quwara (40 miles N.W. Buraida). Mutair leaders Azaiyiz ibn Faisal, Duwish Faisal, ibn Shiblian and Abdullah Ibn Majid endeavoured dissuade Duwish from assisting ibn Humaid and refused support him against Ibn Saud. Ibn Humaid offered return loot taken from Najd tribes and pay blood money but Ibn Saud refused insisting that Ibn Humaid in person attend Shara Court. Duwish asked safe conduct for ibn Humaid under guarantee of 3 leading ulima. This also refused and Ibn Humaid ordered report unconditionally. From another source Ibn Saud reported to have 25 war banners and Ibn Humaid four.


























Telegram Code
From Political Kuwait
To Political Bushire
Repeated Mohammedrah for Resident.
No. 263


Dated the 6th (received 7th) April 1929.


Reports indicate beyond reasonable doubt that battle was fought near Zilfi on 29th March in which Ibn Saud gained a decisive victory and inflicted heavy casualties. Dawish died of wounds and Ibn Humaid fled first to Artawiyah and then South. Uzaiyiz suing for peace.


- POLITICAL -


P.C. sent to Sgt. J. under no. 74
Colonel
Muscat


J.
































CONFIDENTIAL.

No. 103-S. of 1929.

British Residency and Consulate-General,

Bushire, 8th April 1929.


Sir,


I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter No. S.O. 673, dated the 21st March 1929, and to enclose in this connection a copy of a letter No. 250-S., dated the 29th March from the Political Agent at Kuwait.


2. Colonel More's letter gives a version of the matter substantially different to the highly coloured and somewhat unbalanced description in Captain Glubb's notes and, as the 'Iraq tribes were to have left Kuwait by the end of March, the Political Resident thinks that a better course might have been to forward in a more dispassionate spirit for verification the obviously exaggerated statements of Captain Glubb. He would also, as head of administration in the Persian Gulf, have appreciated being asked for his own views instead of those of one of his subordinate officers.


3. The position of the Shaikh of Kuwait, standing as he does unsupported between two strong contending parties,

The Political Secretary
to His Excellency the High Commissioner
for Iraq,
BAGHDAD.









CONFIDENTIAL.

British Residency and Consulate-General,
Bushire, 8th April 1929.

No. 16.

Sir,

I have the honour to forward for the information
of His Majesty's Government a copy of this office
letter No. 103-S. of to-day's date to the address of
the Political Secretary to His Excellency the High
Commissioner for 'Iraq.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,


Your most obedient,


humble servant,


Lieut.-Colonel,


for Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.


HIS MAJESTY'S SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES,
COLONIAL OFFICE, DOWNING STREET,
L O N D O N.
































Confidential.

No. 105-S. of 1929.

British Residency and Consulate-General,
Bushire, 9th April 1929.

Akhwan Intelligence.

Sir,

I am directed to forward for the information of
His Excellency the High Commissioner copies of ~~the~~

-----	telegrams
1. Kuwait telegram No. 264, dated 7-4-1929.	'
2. " " 269, " 8-4-1929.	'
3. " " 275, B 8-4-1929.	'
4. <i>Rahman</i> -----	'

noted in
the margin.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your most obedient servant,


Lieut.-Colonel,

Secretary to the Political Resident
in the Persian Gulf.

The Political Secretary
to His Excellency the High Commissioner for Iraq,
B a g h d a d.



"ملف (D 55 61/14 VIII) العلاقات بين نجد والعراق" [٢٩٢ ظ] (٧٨٢/٥٩٠)





CONFIDENTIAL.

260
(293)

British Residency and Consulate-General
Bushire, 9th April 1929.

No. 17.

Sir,

In continuation of the correspondence ending
with this office letter No. 15, dated the 2nd April 1929,
I have the honour to forward for the information of His

1. Bushire Telegram No. 210, dated 26-3-29.	1	
2. Kuwait " 258, " 31-3-1929.	2	M a j e s t y's
3. Baghdad " 33-S., " 1-4-1929.	3	Government,
4. Bushire " 232, " 2-4-1929.	4	
5. Kuwait " 259, " "	5	c o p i e s o f
6. " " 262, " "	6	
7. Bahrain " 305, " 3-4-1929.	7	t e l e g g r a m s
8. Baghdad " 35-S., " 4-4-1929.	8	
9. Kuwait " 596, " 4-4-1929.	9	n o t e d i n t h e
10. Kuwait " 263, " 6-4-1929.	10	
11. " " 264, " 7-4-1929.	11	m a r g i n.
12. " " 268, " 8-4-1929.	12	
13. " " 269, " "	13	
14. " " 274, " "	14	
15. " " 275, " "	15	
16. " " 278, " "	16	
17. Bahrain " 51, " "	17	

I have the honour to be,


Sir,


Your most obedient,


humble servant,


for Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

HIS MAJESTY'S SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR THE COLONIES,
COLONIAL OFFICE,
LONDON.









No. 370/313/3.

JEDDA,

March 13, 1929.

Sir,

I have the honour to forward herewith, together with a translation which I have had prepared, the reply of His Majesty King Ibn Sa'ud to the letter enclosed in your communication No. S.O.75 of January 12.


I have the honour to be,


Sir,


Your obedient servant,


Sd/- H.G. Jakins.

His Majesty's High Commissioner
for 'Iraq, Baghdad.















"ملف (D 55 61/14 VIII) العلاقات بين نجد والعراق" [٢٩٧ظ] (٧٨٢/٦٠٠)









Telegram Code
From Political Bahrein
To Resident Bushire
No.53
Dated 10th (received 11th) April 1929.


Qusaibi has informed me officially of
Bin Saud's victory over the Hajd Malcontents and I
have conveyed my personal congratulations to ~~the~~ him
and to the Amir of Qatif.


- POLITICAL -

'Phone b-deef.
11/4.

post copy to g. J. under an A. d
S/S. " 18 d 16/4/29
Muscat -
H. Baghdad. " d

11/4





[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government.]

EASTERN (ARABIA).

April 11, 1929.

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 1.

[E 1768/323/91]

No. 1.

Foreign Office to Mr. Jakins (Jeddah).

(No. 71.)

Foreign Office, April 11, 1929.

Sir,

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Austen Chamberlain to inform you that the question of the channels to be used for communications between His Majesty's Government, or between the High Commissioners for Iraq, Palestine and Transjordan, and King Ibn Saud has recently been under consideration.

2. You will recollect that in the course of the renewed negotiations with Sir G. Clayton in August 1928 (see paragraph 22 of Sir G. Clayton's despatch of the 3rd September to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, of which a copy was sent to you in Foreign Office Eastern print (Arabia), September 7, 1928, Section 1), the King requested that as far as possible all messages and communications from Iraq, Palestine and Transjordan should in future be sent through His Majesty's agency at Jeddah, even during his periods of residence in Nejd. In view of this request, the system hitherto in force, which has not proved entirely satisfactory, has been reviewed; and you should in future be guided by the instructions contained in the enclosed memorandum, which lays down the system which will be adopted until further notice.

I am, &c.

MONTEAGLE.

Enclosure in No. 1.

Communications with Ibn Saud.

UNTIL August 1928 communications intended for Ibn Saud were sent through His Majesty's agent and consul at Jeddah when Ibn Saud was in the Hejaz, or through the Resident in the Persian Gulf (at Bushire) when Ibn Saud was in Nejd.

2. In August 1928 Ibn Saud requested that this arrangement should no longer be followed, but that in future all communications should be addressed to him through His Majesty's agent and consul, even during his periods of residence in Nejd. It may therefore now be laid down as a general rule that all communications for Ibn Saud shall pass through His Majesty's agency at Jeddah.

3. The High Commissioners at Bagdad and Jerusalem are authorised to correspond direct with Ibn Saud on matters of detail arising out of the Bahra and Hadda agreements, and such communications will ordinarily be sent through His Majesty's agent at Jeddah, who will act merely as a channel of communication. In cases of extreme urgency, however, it will still be open to the High Commissioners to communicate with Ibn Saud through the quickest available channel, while sending a repetition or copy to His Majesty's agent and consul at Jeddah. Communications intended for Ibn Saud will ordinarily be addressed to His Majesty's agent at Jeddah direct by the High Commissioners concerned, but copies in the case of despatches, and repetitions in the case of telegrams, should in every case be sent to the Colonial Office.

4. As a general rule, such communications, whether sent by telegram or despatch, will be transmitted textually by His Majesty's agent at Jeddah, and they should be drafted on that understanding. His Majesty's agent will, however, have discretion, more particularly in the case of telegrams, to introduce any minor modifications of style or wording which, in the light of his local knowledge, he may consider desirable. It will further be open to His Majesty's agent at Jeddah, in any case where he considers that the proposed communication raises issues of political importance, to refer to the Foreign Office for instruction. Information received from the Iraqi and Transjordan Governments respecting raids on their tribes by Nejdian tribesmen, or replies from those Governments to complaints by the Hejazi Government respecting raids on Hejazi or Nejdian tribesmen, should, subject to the proviso indicated above, be communicated by His Majesty's agent to the Hejazi Government, without awaiting the receipt of instructions from London.


[763 1-1]






5. Communications for Ibn Saud, or regarding Nejdian or Hejazi affairs, from Iraq, Transjordan or Palestine on all other questions should be addressed to the Colonial Office, but repeated, or copied, to Jeddah in every case. In such cases His Majesty's agent at Jeddah will not take official action on the communication until specifically authorised to do so by the Foreign Office. He may, however, if the matter to be dealt with is in any way urgent, take such informal action with the competent Hejazi authorities as he may think desirable.


6. Similarly, His Majesty's agent at Jeddah may address the High Commissioners for Iraq, Transjordan and Palestine direct on points of fact, on matters of routine, or in reply to enquiries, sending a repetition, or copy, in each case to the Foreign Office; while on all other questions he will address the Foreign Office direct, sending a repetition or copy to Bagdad or Jerusalem, when either is concerned, and reporting in each case in the body of the telegram or despatch that he has done so.


Foreign Office, April 1929.
































Telegram P.

From. High Commissioner, Baghdad.

To. Political Resident, Bushire, repeated Political Kuwait.

No. 39/S.

Dated 12th (recd 13th) April 1929.


Your telegrams Nos 223 and 232 indicated that consent of Sheikh to presence of armoured cars had first been obtained up till the end of March and then for a few days longer.



My telegram 33/S read with my No 35/S indicated that permission was desired to retain them in Kuwait for periods of several days at a time so long as Iraq tribes are grazing across the frontier. In the circumstances I find that amazement of Political Agent is somewhat incomprehensible.


If presence of cars is objected to by Sheikh or you consider their presence undesirable position will have to be reconsidered by me but at present I have no indication that that is the case.


Above refers to your telegram No 251.

P.C. sent to G. J. I. under No 108 by 16/4/29
8/5 colonis .. 18 by 16/4
Bahram & Muscat ?









CONFIDENTIAL.

S 1955-2,000-9-14-(EE)

Spl-Resdt P G 118

No. 108-S. of 1929.

Forwarded to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political
Department, for information, in continuation of this office letter No. 102-S.,
with reference to telegram endorsement
dated the 7th April 1929.

Subject: Akhwan Intelligence.

By order,

Forbes

Lieut.-Colonel,

Secretary to
~~Second Assistant~~ to the Political
Resident in the Persian Gulf.


Bushire:


The 14th April 1929.


List of Papers.


1. Kuwait telegram No. 264, dated 7th April 1929.
2. " " 268, " 8th "
3. " " 269, " 8th "
4. " " 270, " 8th "
5. " " 274, " 8th "
6. Kuwait " 275, " 8th "
7. Bahrain " 51, " 8th "
8. Kuwait " 278, " 8th "
9. Bushire " 251/7, " 10th "
10. Bahrain " 53, " 10th "
11. Kuwait " 282, " 11th "
12. Baghdad " 39-S., " 12th "
13. " " 40-S., " 12th "
14. " " 41-S., " 12th "
15. Bushire " 256, " 13th "


(with 1 s.e. of enclosures)



































Telegram P.


From. Political Agent, Kuwait.
To. Political Resident, Bushire.
No. 288.
Dated 14th (recd 15th) April 1929.


In view of telegram Nos 32/S and 33/S from High Commissioner Baghdad I still think I have good reason to be amazed that there are still Mesopotamian tribes which have not moved back to the frontier and still more so that section of armoured cars should continue to be encamped about five miles north of Jahrah.


In my 259 I intimated that I had addressed words* or very soon after that date * in my despatch to Shaikh asking him to give his assent to concentration of cars up to the end of March. April 4th can hardly be called * very soon *after March 31st as original period was only for a month. Assent granted by Shaikh in accordance with Baghdad's telegram No 35/S was for armoured cars etc., to be retained in Kuwait territory for two or three days at a time -not to remain there indefinitely. In these circumstances and without further reference to ruler I fail to understand how continued presence of armoured cars in Kuwait can be justified.

I have, in accordance with your instructions, spoken to Shaikh on the subject and, as I anticipated would be the case, he assures me that presence of British armoured cars or police under British control in Kuwait territory for any reasonable time is not objected to by him. Shaikh however makes it quite clear that he would like to be consulted or, at least, told how long this period is likely to be. He does not of course object to tribes grazing,











61/14 700 15/4/29 (316) 282

Telegram Code
From Political Bahrein
To Resident Bushire
No.57
Dated and received the 15th April 1929.

Fahad bin Jilawi is still out with army in desert to north of Masa and Bahrein Sheikh thinks this means that victory over malcontent was not as complete as reported in Reuter's and are anxious for further information. Can you enlighten them ?


- POLITICAL -


PR. H.A. 15/4


Repg "Your 57 better and Hore
he has latent but victory over the
sections seems to have been complete
there was on flash watching Bin
Jilawi"

Issued.
16/4.

JH 15/4









CONFIDENTIAL.

٢١٤
(318)

British Residency and Consulate-General,
Bushire, 16th April 1929.

No. 18.

Sir,

With further reference to my despatch No.
17 of the 9th April 1929, I have the honour to forward

1. Bahrain telegram No. 53, dated 10-4-29.				for the information
2. Kuwait	"	282,	"	11-4-29.
3. Baghdad	"	39-G.,	"	12-4-29.
4. Bushire	"	256,	"	13-4-29.
5. Kuwait	"	287,	"	14-4-29.
6. Kuwait	"	289,	"	15-4-29.

Government copies of
telegrams noted in the
margin.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your most obedient,


humble servant,


٧٤

Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

JHS

HIS MAJESTY'S SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR THE COLONIES,
COLONIAL OFFICE,
LONDON.





CONFIDENTIAL.

No. 113-S. of 1929.

British Residency and Consulate-General,
Bushire, 16th April 1929.

Sir,

I am directed to forward for the information
of His Excellency the High Commissioner for 'Iraq

- | | |
|---|-------------|
| ----- | copies of |
| 1. Bahrain telegram No. 53, dated 10th April. | telegrams |
| 2. Kuwait " 289, dated 15th April. | noted in |
| ----- | the margin. |

I have the honour to be,

Sir,


Your most obedient Servant,

W

Lieut.-Colonel,

Secretary to the Political Resident
in the Persian Gulf.

The Political Secretary
to His Excellency the High Commissioner for 'Iraq,
Baghdad.





61/14

No. 286-S.

Political Agency, Kuwait.

14th April 1929.

BRITISH RESIDENCY.

RECEIVED NO. 340

DATE 16-4-29

ADMINISTRATIVE RECORDS

To

The Secretary to the Hon'ble the Political Resident

in the Persian Gulf,

B U S H I R E.

Copies of the undermentioned messages despatched by the

Special Service Officer, Kuwait, are forwarded herewith for

information in continuation of this office endorsement No.

260-S dated the 1st April 1929.


J.C. Moss


Lieut.-Col.,


Political Agent, Kuwait.


No. HK/ 98 dated the 3rd April 1929.


"	"	99	"	"	4th	"	"
"	"	101	"	"	5th	"	"
"	"	102	"	"	5th	"	"
"	"	116	"	"	8th	"	"
"	"	117	"	"	8th	"	"
"	"	118	"	"	8th	"	"
"	"	119	"	"	8th	"	"















Telegram Enclair
From Howes Kuwait
To Aviation Baghdad
Repeated Glubb and Special Basrah
No.HK/102
Dated the 5th April 1929.

Further my H.K./101 and HK/100 Agent states Duwish spent night at Ibn Saud's camp and during his absence Ibn Humaid unsuccessfully endeavoured persuade Azaiyiz Duwish attack Ibn Saud to release Duwish who he said was arrested. Duwish returned next day and failed induce Ibn Humaid restore loot. Sent messages notifying Ibn Saud of Ibn Humaid's refusal. Ibn Saud then announced no alternative but fight and attacked forthwith. Ibn Rubaiyan formed right flank townsmen in centre and Ibn Nuhaier and Harb left flank. Rebels held Ibn Saud's forces inflicting heavy casualties until enveloping movement from both flanks commenced when they broke and fled towards Artawiyah. Almost all townsmen of Artawiyah with Duwish reported slain. Duwish himself shot through loins was removed by Al Ginni and died before reaching Artawiyah. Ibn Humaid collected remainder his loot from Artawiyah and proceeded direction Ghatghat. Azaiyiz sent message Ibn Saud begging forgiveness. Reported considerable number of Hafir tents mixed with Mutair under Ibn Hannaiya now camped Al Halfa intending make Dakhala to Government.






(324) 290


Telegram Enclaire
From Howes Kuwait
To Aviation Baghdad
Repeated Special Basrah and Glubb
No.HK/116
Dated 8th April 1929.


Further man of Shaikh's left Majmaa day after battle states met Ibn Humaid's force in Shaib Ahtain retreating from Artawiyah. Travelled with messengers of Ibn Saud to As Safa with orders to Jiblan to surrender. They refused saying whilst Duwish lived would fight with him. States Ibn Humaid looted shepherds of Majmaa and camels from Ibn Busaiyis and Suhul during flight. During battle attack on Ataiban made by Ibn Rubaiyan Ibn Busaiyis and Al Hamaidani and on Mutair by Harb Shammam and Hutaim. States Duwish severely wounded and not expected live.


Telegram Enclaire
From Howes Kuwait
To Aviation Baghdad
Repeated Glubb and Special Basrah
No.HK/117
Dated 8th April 1929.

Man from Artawiyah arrived Araibday yesterday states Ibn Lwai with 8 bairaqa joined Ibn Humaid and both making for Madinah to capture it. Reports Ibn Majid (Dushan Mutair) and brother surrendered to Ibn Saud and were pardoned though King reserved right deal with Mutair as he pleased. Confirms looting of camels from Ibn Busaiyis and Suhul by Ibn Humaid. States Duwish very seriously wounded and death imminent.













Telegram Enclaire
From Howes Kuwait
To Aviation Baghdad
Repeated Glubb and Special Basrah
No.HK/119
Dated the 8th April 1929.


Two Dhafiris arrived today from Artawiyah left there 2nd April. Took part in battle and state definitely Duwish now dead. Ibn Humaid had force of 400 when he fled from Artawiyah and Ibn Saud keeping forces mobilised for pursuit. Azaiyiz sent messengers Ibn Saud asking for pardon for Mutair but rumoured messengers were executed by Kings' order. This seems improbable. Azaiyiz then sent mother and two Mutair women with gifts of two horses. Women obtained pardon for Azaiyiz but not for Mutair. Doubtful rumour Ibn Mashour raided Kuwallah and Ibn Musaad set out punish him with 15 bairags. Dhafir and Shammur said to be moving up from Nafud to Tawal.













































































6/1/14

(339)

No. 293-S.

Political Agency, Kuwait.

16th April 1929.

21.4.

22/4

370

22-4-29

CONFIDENTIAL RECORDS.

To

The Secretary to the Hon'ble the Political Resident

in the Persian Gulf,

M U S H I R E.

Copies of the undermentioned messages despatched by the

Special Service Officer, Kuwait, are forwarded herewith for

information, in continuation of this office endorsement No.

286-S dated 14th April 1929.

J. C. Moore

Lieut.-Col.,


Political Agent, Kuwait.


No. HK/ 124 dated 13th April 1929.

" " 125 " 13th " "

" " 132 " 14th " "

" " 14.133 " 14th " "






Telegram Enclair
From Howes Kuwait
To Aviation Baghdad
Repeated Glubb and Special Basrah.
No. HK/132
Dated the 14th April 1929.

Firing heard at Jubail on 8th April
by Kuwait boat arrived today. Traveller also arrived
later from Jubail states news reached them Ibn Humaid
wounded and captured by Ibn Saud's motor forces. His
son reported killed. Reliability of report unknown.
Firing at Jubail was feu de joie and was continued three
days.

Telegram Enclair
From Howes Kuwait
To Aviation Baghdad
Repeated Glubb and Special Basrah
No. HK/133
Dated the 14th April 1929.

Am Nafisi received letter from Hasa
confirming Ibn Humaid wounded and captured between
Hafar al Ahs and Chatghat. Details tomorrow.






341
200


Telegram Enclair
From Howes Kuwait
To Aviation Baghdad
Repeated Glubb and Special Basrah
No.HK/124
Dated the 13th April 1929.

Man from Dhafir camp states following reached ~~the~~ them from Buraidah. Abu al Ala (Ataibah) recovered from Ibn Humaid loot taken in previous raid and returned it Ibn Saud. Towns Buraidah and Anaizah lost approx 150 men in battle. Ibn Musaid ordered pursue Ibn Mashour for recent raid on Ruwallah. Reliability of report unknown. Ibn Murshid and some tents Bani Hussain returned from Nejd and camped near Ibn Suwait.

Telegram Enclair
From Howes Kuwait
To Aviation Baghdad
Repeated Glubb and Special Basrah
No.HK/125
Dated the 13th April 1929.

Nafisi received verbal information from Bahrain that Mutair lost 400 in battle and Ataibah 900 Ibn Saud despatched force of Harb and Mutaim pursue Ibn Humaid. King himself returning Buraidah. Reliability of report unknown but figure 1300 killed similar to previous report of 1200.





Confidential.

British Residency and Consulate-General,

Bushire, 23rd April 1929.

No. 19.

Sir,

With further reference to my despatch No.

18 of the 16th April 1929, I have the honour to

1.	Kuwait telegram No. 288, dated 14-4-1929.	forward
2.	" " 295, " 16-4-1929.	for the
3.	" " 297, " 17-4-1929.	information
4.	" " 298, " 18-4-1929.	of His
5.	" " 300, " 18-4-1929.	M a j e s t y's
6.	Baghdad " 145, " 19-4-1929.	Government
7.	Bushire " 284, " 20-4-1929.	copies of
8.	Kuwait " 302, " 20-4-1929.	

the telegrams noted in the margin.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your most obedient,

humble servant,


O/c


[Signature]


Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.


[Signature]


HIS MAJESTY'S SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR THE COLONIES,
COLONIAL OFFICE,
LONDON.













Dated the 24th (received 25th) April 1929.


Wireless message HK/158 April from
Special Kuwait begins "On 18th April party of 9 Mutair
under Mohamed bin Mazyad bin Majid (Dushany) arrived in
camp of Al Juwaisiri (Uraibdar Awazim) near Uraifijan
where owing to blood feud fight ensued and Ibn Majid and
a slave were killed. 4 Awazim brought into Kuwait by
Sheikh. Ibn Khudhaiyir (Jiblan Mutair) merchant of Kuwait
now camping at Tawal's about to attack Awazim who number
about 40 tents. Sheikh taking steps to prevent further
incidents. Rumoured that Ibn Majid was either on the way
to surrender to Glubb or to visit Sheikh." ends.


Extract from his HK/163 of 23rd April
begins "The Mutair party consisted of 3 of Majid family
2 slaves, 2 Sulubba and 2 other Mutair. They were pro-
ceeding to Kuwait to take refuge ^{from} in Ibn Saud who told
Dawish he would not pardon them for killing Suhaut Ibn
Al Jaba." ends.

Sheikh says he is satisfied that they were not refugees from Ibn Saud in the true sense of the word but were told by Dawish to go to Ibn Jiluwi or to Kuwait as they preferred until their case was settled in accordance with religious law. They are now at Kuwait not as prisoners but under surveillance.


- POLITICAL -


$\sqrt[n]{\frac{25}{4}}$
 Copy sent to ^{W. J.} ^{W. J.} - vide No
 D.B. ^{8/5} ^{muscat} - No

















[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government.]

EASTERN (ARABIA).

May 22, 1929.

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 2.

[E 2594/2322/91]

No. 1.

Mr. Jakins to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received May 22.)

(No. 99.)

Jeddah, April 29, 1929.

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 98 of the 28th April, I have the honour to forward herewith a translation of a further extract from the "Um-el-Qura" concerning the action taken by Ibn Saud against Faisal-ed-Doweish and Ibn Bujad.

2. This extract reports the flight of Faisal and Ibn Bujad, the former seriously wounded, after a decisive encounter on the 30th March. Ibn Saud subsequently consented to receive the submission of Faisal-ed-Doweish, after he had recovered from his wounds, on condition that he held no communication with his tribe, the Mutair. Ibn Bujad proceeded to Riyadh to surrender himself there, lest his life should be endangered by his presenting himself in the Royal camp.

3. The day after the battle Ibn Saud called together the ulama and the chief tribesmen to the number of 2,000 that, warned by the recent incidents, they might arrive at an improved line of conduct. He therefore suggested that, so far as religion was concerned, they must rely on the rulings of the ulama and not on their individual judgment; that they should give him their complete allegiance; that they should hold no meetings or assemblies without his permission; and, finally, that they should respect their fellow Moslems and their property.


4. The ulema approved of these proposals, which exactly met the wishes of the assembled chieftains.

I have, &c.

H. G. JAKINS.

* Not printed.

[791 y—2]





SGPA...621...1081...5,000...18 9 22.

SECRET.

6/4/29

BUSHIRE RESIDENCY.

Reg. No. 389

Date 30/4/29

CONFIDENTIAL RECORDS.

H. C. F. 16.

SECRETARIAT OF H. E. THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR 'IRAQ

No. S.O. 910

Baghdad, 23rd April, 1929.

By direction of His Excellency the High Commissioner for 'Iraq, a copy of correspondence as marked below is forwarded with compliments to :—

The Secretary to the Hon'ble
the Political Resident in the
Persian Gulf, Bushire.


Abul Hasan Ali Nadwi


Political Secretary
to H. E. The High Commissioner for 'Iraq.


Enclosures :—


Extract from the Report of the Southern Desert Administration
for the month of March, 1929, regarding relations with Kuwait.


F.C.





















- 4 -


owner without compensation all trading in camels would cease. No merchant would risk his capital in buying camels, were they likely to be seized from him without compensation by any bedouin who claimed them as once having been his property. It is, therefore, however, a universal custom that camels taken in raids cannot be claimed by their original owner, should the man in whose possession they are found have bought them. Ibn Subah, however, is regardless of custom or right, within the walls of his town, when dealing with 'Iraq subjects.


A notable contrast was afforded by his treatment of the Mutair caravans arriving in Kuwait. Mutair, of course, possess very large numbers of camels raided by them from Kuwait. There is no record, however, of a Mutairi being dragged from his camel and the latter seized by the Shaikh, as was done in the case of 'Iraqis.

These, and several other similar incidents, were aggravating rather than serious, but they provoked great indignation amongst the 'Iraq tribes.

Morally Ibn Subah may think himself quite justified in allying himself with the Akhwan. Neither Ibn Sa'ud nor His Majesty's Government have ever made any real attempt to defend him, and he may well, in these circumstances, plead that he is justified in looking after himself. Such manoeuvres are a regular feature of Arabian politics. Ibn Subah has been no more dishonest than Ibn Sa'ud, who, from 1922 to 1926, took one fifth of the loot raided by the Akhwan from 'Iraq, while at the same time, professing to His Majesty's Government the gravest displeasure at the Akhwan attacks and promising to punish them. Nor, for that matter, has he, in the popular mind, been any weaker than His Majesty's Government, who from 1922 to 1927, allowed









6/14

SECRET

SGPS. 621...1081...5,000...18 9 2a.

H. C. F. 16.

SECRETARIAT OF H. E. THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR IRAQ

No. S.O. 909

Res. No. 390

Date 30/4/29

Baghdad, 23rd April, 1929.

By direction of His Excellency the High Commissioner for 'Iraq, a copy of correspondence as marked below is forwarded with compliments to :—


The Secretary to the Hon'ble
the Political Resident in the
Persian Gulf, Bushire. (2 copies).

Political Secretary to
to H. E. The High Commissioner for 'Iraq.

Enclosures :—

Extract from the Report of the Southern Desert
Administration for the month of March, 1929.

T.C.






357
321
Extract from Report of the Southern Desert Administration
for the month of March, 1929.

NAJD SITUATION AND ACTIVITIES OF AKHWAN TRIBES.

The combined offensive of Ibn Humaid, the Duwish, Ibn Hithlain and Ibn Shqair have already been reported in this office monthly report for February. It has been explained how, on 19th February, Ibn Humaid, apprehensive of government defensive measures, raided Najd instead of 'Iraq tribes, and how the Duwish, having reached Julaida with the avowed intention of attacking the Administrative Inspector's camp, turned back within six hours march of the latter.

Ibn Humaid not only raided the Sinjara Shammar, Najd subjects and themselves Akhwan, and the Dahamshah and Ruwallah, respectively 'Iraq and Syrian subjects, seduced by Ibn Sa'ud and having paid taxes to him, but also a large number of Agail merchants, mostly townsmen of Buraidah, one of the most Wahhabi of the Najd towns. All the bedouins of Arabia live largely by the sale of camels to itinerant merchants, who drive their purchases across the desert for sale in Egypt or Syria. The immunity of merchants from molestation by bedouin raiders was therefore, doubtless, originally dictated by economic needs. In the old bedouin wars, both parties depended for their livelihood on the sale of camels to such merchants, and their free movement amongst the tribes, even while at war, was an economic necessity to all parties. That, however, which was undoubtedly originally a question of financial economy, soon became imperceptibly a point of honour, and to raid Agail merchants, under the old Arab dispensation, was an unheard of breach of the rules of war. When the fanatic revival of Wahhabism occurred, ten to fifteen years ago, this






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this custom remained inviolate, not only because economic necessity dictated it, as before, but also because the town of Buraidah, the home of the great majority of camel dealers, was distinguished (coupled perhaps with Riyadh) as the most religious or fanatical of the Najd towns. Ibn Humaid, however, not only looted the flocks of the Agail merchants at Nawadhir, but the merchants themselves were massacred, almost, it appears, to a man. Even the bloody and treacherous annals of Wahhabism could produce few parallels to such a crime. Reports from Najd indicate that, whether or not Ibn Sa'ud would in any case have taken action against Ibn Humaid, the massacre of the Agail merchants created such an outcry amongst townspeople of Najd, as almost to compel him to take action. While Ibn Sa'ud has long regarded with equanimity if not with approval, the disasters inflicted on the 'Iraq tribes by his subjects, he could scarcely, without endangering his throne, regard with indifference the massacre by Ibn Humaid of the merchants of Buraidah. Early in March therefore he proceeded to Buraidah, where he called upon the loyal tribes to rally, and raised a levy of the townspeople.

The Duwish, meanwhile, after his abortive attempt to attack the Administrative Inspector, was camped with his forces at Umm Ashar, in the Batin between Al Hafar and Al Thimami. On receipt of news of Ibn Sa'ud's preparations, the Duwish sent an urgent message to Ibn Humaid, who was camped at Lina dividing his loot, to join him at Umm Ashar. Ibn Humaid moved, in compliance, from Lina, and joined forces with the Duwish near Jarab.

The pair moved slowly southwards, and were reported at the end of the month between Zilfi and Ain ibn Fuhaid in the Qasim. Meanwhile it appears that correspondence had been passing






passing between the two sides. Ibn Sa'ud offered to refer the dispute between himself and Ibn Humaid to the Shara' or religious law. It is still not clear whether the proposal was accepted or rejected. The Duwish, on the other hand, acting in a manner as intermediary between Ibn Sa'ud and Ibn Humaid, offered the return of the loot taken by Ibn Humaid from Najd tribes, on condition that that looted from 'Iraq tribes might be retained. It is said that these terms were refused by Ibn Sa'ud. In brief, in spite of frequent reports during the month that a clash between the two armies was imminent, no report of a battle had been received by the end of the month. It seems probable that the rebel tribes, though undoubtedly outnumbered by Ibn Sa'ud's force, are sufficiently strong to inflict very heavy losses if attacked by him.

BEDOUIN MUTAIR.

While these events were in progress between Ibn Sa'ud Ibn Humaid, and the Duwish, the bedouin portion of Mutair were camped at the commencement of March along the southern boundary of Kuwait, from Ash Shaqq, to Umm Amarah west. They had moved to this area partly to be near Kuwait town, with a view to replenishing their supplies. Meanwhile Ibn Shqair, Al R Fugham and Ibn Lami with their war banners, were at Aba al Hiran, just south of the Kuwait frontier.

On 3/3/29, this force, some five hundred strong raided some thirty tents of Bani Malik shepherds beneath the walls of Kuwait. This incident has already been reported on. Many men from the Mutair camps on the Kuwait frontier joined the raid.

On 8/3/29, two police cars on patrol near Umm Amarah west were suddenly fired upon by a party of about forty horsemen. The police cars turned the eastern flank of the horsemen






horsemen and continued to travel south, with the object of ascertaining whether the party was advanced guard of a raiding party. They came in sight of grazing camels and sheep, however, and, satisfied that they were dealing with a camp not a raiding party, endeavoured to retire to the north. The horsemen, however, had meanwhile cut off their retreat. The police fired a few shots at the horsemen with their rifles, in the hope of causing them to retire, having been instructed that their role was to scout and not to provoke a battle. The rifle shots rather encouraged than intimidated the horsemen, probably creating in them the impression that the cars had not got machine guns. The horsemen, who could gallop considerably faster than the cars could travel (they were two new Ford lorries), pressed boldly on the cars firing rapidly from the saddle. Meanwhile camel and footmen were advancing from the camp to join in the battle. The N.C.O. in command thereupon hoisted the "open fire" signal, and the police opened upon the enemy with two Lewis guns. Three men and one horse were killed. The horsemen immediately scattered precipitately, and the cars were able to make good their retreat.

The incident produced a deep moral effect. The camp, which proved to be that of Mutlaq ibn Jarbu', (Diyahin section) fled ~~xxxx~~ incontinently, abandoning a quantity of household property in their flight. The majority of the other camps in the vicinity retired towards Lusafa.

A number of Mutair camps, however, remained in the vicinity of Ash Shaqq.

On 17-3-29, two taxis employed on scouting duty near Ash Shaqq, encountered a Mutair caravan proceeding to Kuwait. The Mutairis opened a heavy fire on the cars, which was returned by the latter, which contained four riflemen. The cars made
good





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
good their escape, the caravan having no horsemen.

On 18-3-29, a more dangerous incident occurred. Two scout taxis came in sight of grazing camels west of Subaihiya. At this moment, the driver of one of the cars proclaimed that his petrol was finished, got out of the car, opened a fresh tin and prepared to pour it into the tank. While the cars were halted, a number of men suddenly advanced from amongst the camels and opened fire. It was some minutes before the driver could screw down the stopper of the tank, start up his engine, and get in. During this period, the situation of the cars was critical.

Eventually the cars were able to get on the move and effect their retreat, no horsemen having appeared on the scene. It appears that the men were from a mixed camp of Rashaida and Mutair. The horses were probably out grazing and could not be caught in time to join in the action. In the course of their retirement, the cars ran into another flock of camels close by, which they had not seen in their advance. The men with these also opened fire. Seeing them to be few in number, the cars returned the fire, whereupon the men fled, and the cars drove off some twenty camels.

The occupants of the cars consisted of Dhafir tribesmen, under the command of one constable of the desert police. The latter had received strict orders not to loot, and, as a result, was dismissed from the police next day. The Administrative Inspector was at the time greatly displeased at the bringing in of these twenty camels. Actually, however, the incident probably did more good than harm. After it, the camps in the Ash Shaqq area also disappeared, and Mutair caravans to Kuwait made a wide detour coming up between Subaihiya and the sea coast.

The





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The presence of these camps within some forty miles of that of the Administrative Inspector had for the period of a month, rendered scout patrols almost useless. It would have been easy for a raiding party to have lain up unperceived in these camps by day, and to have advanced after dark, covered the intervening distance at night, and attacked the 'Iraq tribes at dawn.


On or about 20/3/29, a sudden orgy of raid and counter raid broke between the Mutair bedouins and their neighbours. Mutair raided Sebei, and Sebei Mutair, Mutair raided the Ajman, capturing two flocks of camels belonging to Ibn Jiluwi. Mutair also raided Harb but were repulsed.

A few days after this outburst, however, an urgent messenger from the Duwish reached the Mutair bedouins, calling upon them to send their fighting men immediately to his support. It is stated that his first intention was to raid Muhsin al Firm (Harb) who had intercepted some men returning from Ibn Humaid's raid and relieved them of their loot. Muhsin al Firm, however, received warning and collected all his followers, the Bani Ali division of Harb, at Ajibba.

Either through reluctance to risk a bloody encounter now that Harb were prepared, or because Ibn Sa'ud's forces were too close to make it advisable for the Duwish to leave on a separate expedition, the idea of raiding Harb was apparently abandoned, and the Duwish, with his Mutair reinforcements, remained with Ibn Humaid.

IBN SHQAIR, AL FUGHAM, IBN LAMI AND IBN HITHLAIN.

As already reported, Ibn Shqair, Al Fugham and Ibn Lami were camped at Aba al Hiran at the commencement of the month, and on 3-3-29, raided Bani Malik outside the walls of Kuwait. After this success, they retired to their homes in Jariya,





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
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Jariya, and took no further action during the month.

When the Duwish called upon the Mutair bedouins to join him with their fighting men, he ordered the three above mentioned Shaikhs with Ibn Hithlain to remain in the Jariya area, prepared to repulse any advance undertaken by Ibn Jiluwi. In spite, however, of continual reports of the collection of large forces by Ibn Jiluwi, no action was taken by him during the month.

Meanwhile Ibn Hithlain was camped with a force of about 150 men at Khabari Wahdhha, some ninety miles south of Jahra-h. The continued presence of this force within 24 hours march of the 'Iraq tribes, caused great anxiety throughout the month. Although the nucleus of his force was only one hundred and fifty men, it would probably have been joined by anything up to two hundred more from the neighbouring bedouin camps, within a few hours, had he set out to raid. He need not have crossed the Najd-Kuwait frontier until after dark, and could still have attacked the 'Iraq tribes at dawn next morning, and thus car patrols were not a practical protection.

Early in the month, a party of camel scouts from this raid actually reconnoitred the camp of No.6 Armoured Car Company near Hissu Adh Dhabbi. The Administrative Inspector on 7-3-29, encountered this party of twelve camelmén about noon, some ten miles south of Jal al Liyah. The Administrative Inspector was in a single touring car, and was on his way to visit No. 6 Armoured Cars Company. Seeing a force of camelmén with no tribes in the vicinity, he halted some three hundred yards away, and sent an Arab on foot to cross question the party. They replied that they were Araibdar, and the Arab sent to them recognised one of them as such. They stated that they were from a camp of the Tawatha section of Araibdar, south





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south of Qara al Muru. Subsequent enquiries proved that there was no such camp.


It was subsequently ascertained that this party was actually Ibn Hithlain's scouts. Had not one of their party been recognised as belonging to Araibdar, the Administrative Inspector could easily have reached No. 6 A.C.C. who were only twelve miles away, and have brought them up to attack the scouts. On this and several other occasions during the month, however, the active cooperation of Araibdar with the enemy made defensive measures very difficult.

A large part of the Araibdar are of the Ajman tribe, of which Ibn Hithlain is the Shaikh, and they have undoubtedly been assisting the Akhwan for the past three months.

The scout party, on returning home, reported that the camp consisted of only three armoured cars and one tent. They may have thought that they had seen the Administrative Inspector's camp.

It is reported that Dhaidan Ibn Hithlain thereupon sent urgent messages to Mutair, asking for three hundred picked men to supplement his force, with the object of rushing the camp at night and killing the Administrative Inspector, an ambition long cherished by many of the Akhwan. At the last moment, however, the enterprise was abandoned or postponed either through fear of an advance by Ibn Jiluwi, or because the outbreak of inter-raiding between the Akhwan tribes kept Mutair occupied elsewhere.

Towards the end of the month, Ibn Hithlain sent messengers to the Awazim, urging them to join him. The Awazim had, up to this time, been loyal to Ibn Jilawi, and are moreover bitter enemies of Braih Mutair. Reports, however, indicated





indicated that the Awazim were, at the time, very apprehensive of attack. It is not clear as yet, whether they accepted Ibn Hithlain's invitation or not, but they may possibly have done so out of fear, especially in view of the apparent inactivity of Ibn Jiluwi.


THE STONY DESERT AND WADIAH.

With the departure of Ibn Humaid from Lina for Jarab early in the month, no Akhwan forces remained in the Stony Desert area.

Meanwhile, however, two minor Anaizah chiefs had commenced to mimic the activities of the successful rebel leaders.

Farhan ibn Mashshur ibn Shaalan is, of course, a Syrian subject and a junior member of the Shaikhly family of Ruwallah. Two years ago, as the result of a family dispute with Nuri ibn Shaalan, he left Syria and visited Ibn Sa'ud, who made him handsome presents, and gave him a village and cultivation near Hail, at Shaibah. Encouraged by the impunity with which Mutair and Ataibah have, for two years, gorged themselves with loot from both Najd and 'Iraq tribes, while Ibn Sa'ud sits passive, Farhan ibn Mashshur on 28-2-29, raided thirty tents of the Suwailmat Dahamshah in the Wadi Ar'ar. The raid was one of massacre, in true Akhwan style, thirteen men of the Dahamshah being killed. All the property and flocks of the camp were looted. The Suwailmat had not paid taxes to Ibn Sa'ud.

Murdhi al Rufidi is an 'Iraq subject, and one of the principal Shaikhs of the Amarat. Two years ago, as the result of a dispute with Ibn Hadhdhal he left 'Iraq and
crossed





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crossed to Najd (subsequent to the Bahra treaty). He was warmly welcomed by Ibn Sa'ud, given money and gifts, and settled in a village with cultivation at Bilaziya, in the province of Hail.

This man, on 14-3-29, carried out a blood thirsty raid on a large camp of Sulubba, south of Akhwadhah. The number of men massacred has been variously reported at between forty and eighty. The Bannaq section of Sulubba, the principal victims, are themselves Najdis. Three 'Iraq merchants, one a native of Najaf, and two of Kubaisah, were killed in the Sulubba camp.


MOVEMENTS OF THE 'IRAQ TRIBES.

EASTERN AREA.

On the first of March, the main concentration of 'Iraq tribes, accompanied by the Administrative Inspector, were camped at Umm al Madafa, in Kuwait territory. Of those present, the Zayyad and Dhafir camped round the Administrative Inspector's camp, and moved everywhere with him. These two are the hardiest of the desert tribes of this area. Behind them, swarmed a heterogeneous mass of Jasham, Rufai, Sa'adah, Sadun, and odds, and ends, some of whom had never before camped east of the Euphrates. The Budur remained throughout the month in the Rukbi-Chilawa-Jarishan area, behind the post of the 'Iraq Army Motor Machine Gun Company at Adhaibah.

The Juwarin spent the first three weeks of the month near Raudhatain, with Bani Malik (twice raided this year) behind them.

The Administrative Inspector, accompanied by the Zayyad and Dhafir, with the hoi polloi moving parallel to and
north





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north of him, moved camp during March as follows:-

- 1/3/29. From Ruhail to Umm al Madafa.
- 6/3/29. Umm al Madafa to Shiqqat al Jalib.
- 11/3/29. Shiqqat al Jalib to Adhairat al Handh.
- 19/3/29. Adairat al Handh to five miles south of Qara al Muru.
- 23/3/29. Qara al Muru to a point five miles N.W. of Jahrah.

Jahrah

FIGHTING SPIRIT OF THE 'IRAQ TRIBES.


A total of nearly two hundred rifles was distributed to the tribes during the month, chiefly to the Zayyad and Dhafir. The same policy as was outlined in the month report for February was continued. These two tribes remained constantly concentrated round the Administrative Inspector's camp, and frequent ardhas and hausas were held to keep up the offensive (or rather defensive) spirit. While it is doubtful whether these tribes would really have fought in the event of a heavy Akhwan attack, yet these manoeuvres undoubtedly produced a considerable deterrent moral effect on the enemy.

DESERT FORCES.

Actions with the Enemy.

Ibn Humaid's raid. Definite information has now been received of the manner of the death of constables Radhi as Salim and Sulman Al Lafi, of the Southern Desert Camel Corps, who were killed in Ibn Humaid's raid near Jumaimah, on 19/2/29. The two constables had been sent to warn the shepherds to retire. They spent the night with the Zayyad and left their camp at dawn next morning. An hour after they left them, the Zayyad were raided. A man of the tribe has now reported to Sulman. He states that he fled on foot when the raid began, and concealed himself in a rocky ledge some miles

north





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
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
north of the site of the camp. From his place of concealment, he saw the two camel constables also retiring northwards. When about a mile from him, they were overtaken by a force of thirty horsemen. The two constables dismounted, lay down on a small hillock and opened fire. The informant estimates that they maintained the unequal contest for a period which estimated as two hours, keeping up a steady fire at all who approached, while they were gradually surrounded by an increasing number of the enemy. Eventually the fire of the two constables ceased, and the informant states that he saw one of them stand up and wave. The Akhwan then rushed the hill and he saw no more.

Another man, a Shammari, who visited the site of the raid some days later in the hopes of picking up stray animals or property on the battle field, has also reported to the police. He alleges that he found the bodies of the two policemen on a small hill. Beside each corpse was a pile of about two hundred empty cartridge cases. The corpses were riddled with dagger wounds and bullet wounds fired at very short range.

A third man of the Najd Shammar reports that he spent a night with Ibn Humaid's force after the raid. He alleges that he heard the raiders discussing the fight put up by two long camelmen, saying that these two kafirs had inflicted more loss on the Muslimin than all the tribes raided put together.

It appears that the two constables must have fought on until all their ammunition was exhausted, when they were rushed and butchered in cold blood. It is hoped that the 'Iraq Government will award a generous gratuity to the dependents of the two men who died so gallantly in action.





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CONFIDENTIAL.

No. 311-S.

Political Agency, Kuwait.
29th April 1929.

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BUSHIRE RESIDENCY.
Reg. No. 600
Date 30/4/29
CONFIDENTIAL RECORDS.



To
The Secretary to the Hon. the Political Resident
in the Persian Gulf,
BUSHIRE.
Special Service Officer, Kuwait.



MEMORANDUM.

Reference my endorsement No.299-S of 18th April 1929.
I enclose herewith copies of the undermentioned messages despatched by the Special Service Officer, Kuwait.
Flight Lieutenant Howes is leaving for Baghdad this morning, having been summoned to Air Headquarters for a conference by the Air Staff, Intelligence. He considers it more than probable that it will be decided that a Special Service Officer is no longer necessary at Kuwait, and that he will not return here at all.

J.C. Moore
Lieut.-Col.,
Political Agent, Kuwait.

No.	HK/	150	dated	19	April	1929.
"	"	153	"	20	"	"
"	"	158	"	22	"	"
"	"	159	"	22	"	"
"	"	164	"	23	"	"
"	"	165	"	23	"	"
"	"	175	"	25	"	"
"	"	180	"	26	"	"
"	"	181	"	26	"	"
"	"	186	"	28	"	"





To Aviation repeated Glubb Special Basrah
From Howes Kuwait.

HK/150-19/4 Reference my HK/133 of 14/4

Nafisi now returned aaa No confirmation Ibn Humaid
wounded and captured aaa Sorry I booted aaa

Ibn Saud sent letter to Nafisi via Hama dated 31/3
stating he had offered Akhwan chance to submit to Shara
promising safe conduct and immunity from punishment aaa



Duwish visited him and promised bring in Ibn Humaid
but returned and rejoined latter in opposition aaa



Ibn Humaid refused submit and Akhwan were therefore attack-
ed on 30/3 with great slaughter aaa Duwish reached



Artawiyah seriously wounded and Ibn Humaid fled from
Artawiyah same night with following of 400 aaa



Mohammed (Kings brother) pursuing with seven bairaga



S. H. H.

















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

To Aviation reptd Glubb & Special Basrah
From Howes Kuwait.
HK/164 23/4
Reference HK/158 22/4 Mutair party consisted
of three of Majid family two slaves two sulubba
and two other Mutairis aaa Were proceeding Kuwait
to take refuge from Ibn Saud whé told Duwish he
would not pardon them for killing Suhaim ibn al Jaba
a Mutair
(My signal of 27/3) ~~xxxxxx~~ follower of Ibn Saud
aaa Agent from Subaihiya reports ibn Hathlain
reinstated as Shaikh Ajman for having submitted to
Ibn Saud before battle of Sibilla aaa States Ibn
Jilluwi wrote Ibn Hathlain saying Fahad proceeding
with 200 men for taxation and in pursuit of Ibn Majid
and requested Ibn Hathlains assistance aaa
Rumour unconfirmed that Mutair of Pédawiyah have
asked assistance from Ibn Shuqair to avenge Ibn Majid
by attack on Awazim aaa


Sutowsky


To Aviation reptd Glubb Special Basrah
From Howes Kuwait.
HK/165 23/4
Sulubba caravan from camp between Jariya and Wabra
deny Ibn Hathlain reinstated aaa State five men from
Ibn Jilluwi with representative Ibn Shuqair now with
Jiblan at As Safa collecting last years loot aaa
State Ibn Saud moved Shagra where received message from
Ibn Humaid asking pardon aaa Reply was he must ask in
person at Riyadh aaa State Ibn Shuqair and Al Fughm
did not fight as thgy were in communication with Ibn
Saud before battle aaa Reliability unknown.


Sutowsky























5. Communications for Ibn Saud, or regarding Nejdian or Hejazi affairs, from Iraq, Transjordan or Palestine on all other questions should be addressed to the Colonial Office, but repeated, or copied, to Jeddah in every case. In such cases His Majesty's agent at Jeddah will not take official action on the communication until specifically authorised to do so by the Foreign Office. He may, however, if the matter to be dealt with is in any way urgent, take such informal action with the competent Hejazi authorities as he may think desirable.

6. Similarly, His Majesty's agent at Jeddah may address the High Commissioners for Iraq, Transjordan and Palestine direct on points of fact, on matters of routine, or in reply to enquiries, sending a repetition, or copy, in each case to the Foreign Office; while on all other questions he will address the Foreign Office direct, sending a repetition or copy to Bagdad or Jerusalem, when either is concerned, and reporting in each case in the body of the telegram or despatch that he has done so.

Foreign Office, April 1929.



Kuwait telegram 501-S, d. 6 recd 7/12.28

Post copy to India & to S. of S. for Colonies. Should suffice: JK 8/12.

JK 8/12

Kuwait tel. 503-S, d. & r. 8.12.28.

In place of the despatch forwarding Telegram 501-S, I have substituted another forwarding both telegrams. It will catch tomorrow's mail. JK 11/12.

P.R.

Bar 11/12


JK 11/12


Kuwait telegrams 507-S and 508-S, d. 14.12.28.


Copies as usual to Colonies, India & Bahrain. JK 16/12.


This file is one for Major Murphy's perusal. The F.O. despatch at p. 188, the draft note at p. 183 and the Baghdad despatch at p. 172 give the position up to date. JK 16/12.


JK 17/12











P.A. Kuwait's Telegram 207, d. 22.3.29.

Draft tel. to Baghdad submitted.

PR.

23/3

Yes: it can possibly follow when they

off.

23/3

Kuwait tel. 244, d. 29.3.29.


This may refer to the letters sent with Baghdad letter no. 50.624, d. 15.3.29, which reached Bushire on the 21st and may have reached Kuwait later.

The next boat from Kuwait to Bahrain is the one Col. Barrett returns by.

PR

29/3

29/3





Baghdad telegram 39-S, 40-S and 41-S, d.
12.4.29.

PR.

15/4

As regards 39 S I discuss to matter
with Mr. M. at Basra. He will
communicate with me, so we may await
his telegram.

Issue telegrams as regards the other
matter.

15/4

Kuwait telegram no. 288, d. 14.4.29.


In view of the changed conditions, which
may necessitate the continued presence of
armoured cars etc. in Kuwait territory
in order to repel Houtair refugees, it
might perhaps be preferable to delay
action on this telegram.

15/4

We await his reply to our other telegram.

15/4

16/4



Kuwait telegram no. 294, d. 16. 4. 29. (382)

Colonies & Baghdad may be informed
p 268. ref. C.O. tel. 125 of 11. 4.

As regards Message to Ibn Saud, we
may ~~refer~~ await Baghdad's message.

P.R.



17/4



17/4



17/4


Baghdad telegram No. 145, d. 19. 4. 29.

20/4















"ملف VIII (D 55 61/14) العلاقات بين نجد والعراق" [٣٨٤و] (٧٨٢/٧٧٥)











"ملف (D 55 61/14 VIII) العلاقات بين نجد والعراق" [٣٨٥ ظ] (٧٨٢/٧٧٨)









"ملف (D 55 61/14 VIII) العلاقات بين نجد والعراق" [٣٨٦ ظ] (٧٨٠/٧٨٢)





"ملف (D 55 61/14 VIII) العلاقات بين نجد والعراق" [خلفي-داخلي]
(٧٨٢/٧٨١)





"ملف (D 55 61/14 VIII) العلاقات بين نجد والعراق" [خلفي] (٧٨٢/٧٨٢)

